

Extracting Profits from the Public: How Utility Ratepayers Are Paying for Big Tech's Power



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Executive Summary

Some of the largest companies in the world — including Amazon, Google, Meta, and Microsoft — are looking to secure electricity for their energy-intensive operations.¹ Their quests for power to supply their growing “data centers” are super-charging a growing national market for electricity service that pits regional utilities against each other. In this paper, we investigate one aspect of this competition: how utilities can fund discounts to Big Tech by socializing their costs through electricity prices charged to the public. Hiding subsidies for trillion-dollar companies in power prices increases utility profits by raising costs for American consumers.

Because for-profit utilities enjoy state-granted monopolies over electricity delivery, states must protect the public by closely regulating the prices utilities charge for service. Regulated utility rates reimburse utilities for their costs of providing service and provide an opportunity to profit on their investments in new infrastructure. This age-old formula was designed to motivate utility expansion so it would meet society's growing energy demands.

The sudden surge in electricity use by data centers — warehouses filled with power-hungry computer chips — is shifting utilities' attention away from societal needs and to the wishes of a few energy-intensive consumers. Utilities' narrow focus on expanding to serve a handful of Big Tech companies, and to a lesser extent cryptocurrency speculators, breaks the mold of traditional utility rates that are premised on spreading the costs of beneficial system expansion to all ratepayers. The very same rate structures that have socialized the costs of reliable power delivery are now forcing the public to pay for infrastructure designed to supply a handful of exceedingly wealthy corporations.

To provide data centers with power, utilities must offer rates that attract Big Tech customers and are approved by the state's public utility commission (PUC). Utilities tell PUCs what they want to hear: that the deals for Big Tech isolate data center energy costs from other ratepayers' bills and won't increase consumers' power prices. But verifying this claim is all but impossible. Attributing utility costs to a specific consumer is an imprecise exercise premised on debatable claims about utility accounting records. The subjectivity and complexity of ratemaking conceal utility attempts to funnel revenue to their competitive lines of business by overcharging captive ratepayers. While PUCs are supposed to prevent utilities

from extracting such undue profits from ratepayers, utilities' control over rate-setting processes provides them with opportunities to obscure their self-interested strategies.

Detecting wealth transfers from ratepayers to utility shareholders and Big Tech companies is particularly challenging because utilities ask PUCs for confidential treatment of their contracts with data centers, which limits scrutiny of utilities' proposed deals and narrows the scope of regulators' options when they consider utilities' prices and terms. Meanwhile, regulators face political pressure to approve major economic investments already touted by elected officials for their economic impacts. Rejecting new data center contracts could lead potential Big Tech customers to construct their facilities in other states. Indeed, Big Tech companies have repeatedly told utility regulators that unfavorable utility rates could lead them to invest elsewhere.²

In the following sections, we investigate how utilities are shifting the costs of data centers' electricity consumption to other ratepayers. Based on our review of nearly 50 regulatory proceedings about data centers' rates, and the long history of utilities exploiting their monopolies, we are skeptical of utility claims that data center energy costs are isolated from other consumers' bills. After describing the rate mechanisms that shift utility costs among ratepayers, we explain how both existing and new rate structures, as well as secret contracts, could be transferring Big Tech's energy costs to the public. Next, we provide recommendations to limit hidden subsidies in utility rates. Finally, we question whether utility regulators should be making policy decisions about whether to subsidize data centers and speculate on the long-term implications of utility systems dominated by trillion-dollar software and social media companies.

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I. Government-Set Rates Incentivize Utilities to Pursue Data Center Growth at the Expense of the Public

Data centers are large facilities packed with computer servers, networking hardware, and cooling equipment that support services like cloud computing and other data processing applications. While data centers have existed for decades, companies are now building much larger facilities. In 2023, companies began developing facilities that will consume hundreds of megawatts of power, as much as the city of Cleveland.³ As several companies race to develop artificial intelligence (AI), the scale and energy-intensity of data center development is rapidly accelerating. By the end of 2024, companies started building gigawatt-scale data center campuses and are envisioning even larger facilities that will demand more energy than the nation's largest nuclear power plant could provide.⁴

The sudden and anticipated near-term growth of cloud computing infrastructure to accommodate the development of AI is driving a surge of utility proposals to profit from Big Tech's escalating demands. By 2030, data centers may consume as much as 12 percent of all U.S. electricity and could be largely responsible for *quintupling* the annual growth in electricity demand.⁵ This growth is likely to be concentrated in regions with robust access to telecommunications infrastructure and where utilities pledge to quickly meet growing demand. Data centers could substantially expand utilities' size, both financial and physical, as they develop billions of dollars of new infrastructure for Big Tech.⁶

Data center growth is overwhelming long-standing approaches to approving utility rates. Nearly every consumer pays for electricity based on the utilities' average costs of providing service to similar ratepayers. A handful of special interests, particularly large industrial users, pay individualized rates that are negotiated with the utility and often require PUC approval. Data center growth could flip the current ratio of consumers paying general rates to special-interest customers paying unique contracts pursuant to special contracts. In this section, we summarize the potential for massive data center growth and then explore how this growth is challenging long-standing ratemaking practices and is causing the public to subsidize Big Tech's power bills.

A. Utilities Are Projecting Massive Data Center Energy Use

Industry experts and utilities are forecasting massive data center growth, and their projections keep going up. In January 2024, one industry consultancy projected 16 GW of new data center demand by 2030.⁷ But by the end of the year, experts were anticipating data center growth to be as high as 65 GW by 2030.⁸ Individual utilities are even more bullish. For example, Georgia Power anticipates its total energy sales will nearly double by

the early 2030s, a trend it largely attributes to data centers.⁹ In Texas, Oncor announced 82 gigawatts of potential data center load,¹⁰ equivalent to the maximum demand of Texas' energy market in 2024.¹¹ Similarly, AEP, whose multi-state system peaks at 35 GW, expects at least 15 GW of new load from data center customers by 2030,¹² although AEP's Ohio utility added that "customers have expressed interest" in 30 GW of additional data centers in its footprint.¹³

There are reasons, however, to be skeptical of utilities' projections. Utilities have an incentive to provide optimistic projections about potential growth; these announcements are designed in part to grab investors' attention with the promise of new capital spending that will drive future profits.¹⁴ When pressed on their projections, utilities are often reticent to disclose facility-specific details on grounds that a data center's forecasted load is proprietary information.¹⁵ This secrecy can lead utilities and analysts to double-count a data center that requests service from multiple utilities.¹⁶ To acquire power as quickly as possible, data center companies may be negotiating with several utilities to discover which utility can offer service first.

Technological uncertainty further complicates the forecasting challenge. Future innovation may increase or decrease data centers' electricity demand. The current surge in data center growth is traceable to the release of ChatGPT in 2022 and the subsequent burst of AI products and their associated computing needs.¹⁷ Computational or hardware advancements might reduce AI's energy demand and diminish data center demand.¹⁸ For instance, initial reports in January 2025 about the low energy consumption of DeepSeek, a ChatGPT competitor, fueled speculation that more efficient AI models might be just as useful while consuming far less energy. Even if more energy efficient AI models materialize, however, their lower cost could lead consumers to demand more AI services, which could drive power use even higher.¹⁹

Nonetheless, investment is pouring into data center growth. At a January 21, 2025 White House press conference, OpenAI headlined an announcement of \$100 billion in data center investment with the possibility of an additional \$400 billion over four years.²⁰ Earlier that month, Microsoft revealed that it would spend \$80 billion on data centers in 2025, including more than \$40 billion in the U.S.²¹ Two weeks earlier, Amazon said it would spend \$10 billion on expanding a data center in Ohio.²² And two weeks before that, Meta announced its own \$10 billion investment to build a new data center in Louisiana.²³

While the scale and pace of data center growth is impossible to forecast precisely, we know that utilities are projecting and pursuing growth. In the next section, we explore the ratemaking and other regulatory processes that socialize utilities' costs and risks. Unlike

companies that face ordinary business risks to their profitability, utilities rely on government regulators to approve their prices and can manipulate rate-setting processes to offer special deals to favored customers that shift the costs of those discounts to the public. This “hidden value transfer,” a term coined by Aneil Kovvali and Joshua Macey, is a strategy employed by monopolist utilities to increase profits at the expense of their captive ratepayers.²⁴ Regulators are supposed to protect against hidden value transfers by aligning rates with the costs utilities incur to serve particular types of consumers. But this rate design strategy is rife with imprecision. In reality, ratepayers are paying for each other’s electricity consumption, and data center growth could potentially exacerbate the cross-subsidies that are rampant in utility rates.

B. Utility Rates Socialize Power System Costs Using the “Cost Causation” Standard

The U.S. legal system bestows significant economic advantages on investor-owned utilities (IOUs), which are for-profit companies that enjoy state-granted monopolies to deliver electricity. Government-approved electricity prices reimburse utilities for their operational expenses and provide utilities an opportunity to earn a fixed rate of return on their capital investments. With a monopoly service territory and regulated prices designed to facilitate earnings growth, a utility is insulated from many ordinary business risks and shielded from competitive pressures.

Public utility regulators, or PUCs, must protect the public from a utility’s monopoly power and, in the absence of competition, motivate the company to provide reliable and cost-effective service. To meet those goals, PUCs determine whether utility service is offered to all consumers within a utility’s service territory at rates and conditions that are “just and reasonable.”²⁵ This standard, enshrined in state law, requires PUCs to balance captive consumers’ interests in low prices and fair terms of service against the utility’s interest in maximizing returns to its shareholders. A utility rate case is the PUC’s primary mechanism for weighing these competing interests by setting equitable prices for consumers that provide for the utilities’ financial viability.

“Cost causation” is a guiding principle in ratemaking that dictates consumer prices should align with the costs the utility incurs to provide service to that customer or group of similar ratepayers. By approving rates that roughly meet the cost causation standard, PUCs prevent “undue discrimination” between utility ratepayers, a legal requirement that is typically specified in state law.

While the PUC makes the final decision to approve consumer prices, the utility drives the ratemaking process. In a rate case, the utility’s primary goal is to collect enough money to

cover its operating expenses and earn a profit on its capital investments. A utility proposes new rates by filing its accounting records and other data and analysis that form the basis of its preferred prices. Once it establishes its “revenue requirement,” the utility then proposes to divide this amount among groups of consumers based on their usage patterns, infrastructure requirements, and other characteristics that the utility claims inform its costs of providing service to those consumers. Typical groups, also known as ratepayer classes, include residential, commercial, and industrial consumers. Finally, the utility proposes standardized contracts known as tariffs for each ratepayer class that include uniform charges and terms of service for each member of that ratepayer class.

Under this ratemaking process, residential ratepayers often pay the highest rates because they are distributed across wide areas, often in single-family homes that consume little energy.²⁶ The utility recovers the costs of building, operating, and maintaining its extensive distribution system to serve residential ratepayers by spreading those costs over the relatively small amount of energy consumed by households. By contrast, an industrial consumer uses far more energy than a household and is likely connected to the power system through higher voltage lines and needs less local infrastructure than residential ratepayers. The utility can distribute lower total infrastructure costs over far greater energy sales to generate a lower industrial rate. Properly designed rates should “produce revenues from each class of customers which match, as closely as practicable, the costs to serve each class or individual customer.”²⁷

But ratemaking is not “an exact science,” and there is not a single correct result.²⁸ In a utility rate case, various parties advocate for their own self-interest by contesting the utility’s filing. Consumer groups and other parties urge the PUC to reduce the utility’s revenue requirement, which could potentially lower all rates. But once the revenue requirement is set, consumer groups are pitted against each other as they try to reduce their share of the total amount. Their arguments are based on competing approaches to cost causation, with each party claiming that lower rates for itself align with economic principles, fairness, and other subjective values. Well-resourced participants, such as industrial groups that have a significant incentive to argue for lower power costs, hire lawyers and analysts to comb through the utility’s filings and argue that their rates should be lower.

But parties face an uphill battle challenging the utility’s accounting records, engineering studies, and other evidence the utility files to justify its preferred rates. Because it initiates the rate case and generates the information needed for the PUC to approve a rate, the utility is inherently advantaged. The information asymmetry between utilities and other parties, as well as the imprecision and subjectivity of the cost causation standard, can facilitate

subsidization across classes of ratepayers. We highlight three reasons that PUCs may purposefully or unwittingly approve rates that depart from the cost causation standard.

First, attributing the utilities' costs to various ratepayer classes depends on contested assumptions and disputed methodologies. Different approaches to cost allocation will yield different results. As a pioneer in public utility economics once explained, there are "notorious disagreements among the experts as to the choice of the most rational method of [] cost allocation — a disagreement which seems to defy resolution because of the absence of any objective standard of rationality."²⁹ Parties, including the utility, provide the PUC with competing analyses that are designed to meet their own objectives. For instance, industrial consumers will sponsor a study that concludes lower rates for the industrial rate class is consistent with the cost causation principle. Other parties favor their own interests in what can be a zero-sum game over how to divide the utility's revenue requirement.

Second, the PUC may have its own preferences. In most states, utility commissioners are appointed by the governor, but in ten states they are elected officials. Either commissioner may face political pressure to favor a particular ratepayer class. For instance, an elected commissioner may be inclined to provide lower rates to residential ratepayers who will vote on the commissioner's reelection. An appointed commissioner may choose to align utility rates with a governor's economic development agenda by providing lower rates to major employers, such as the commercial or industrial class. Other pressures may bias regulators in favor of other interests. As it weighs competing evidence about cost allocation provided by various parties in a rate case, the PUC has discretion to find a particular study more credible and may choose a rate structure that aligns with the sponsoring party's goals and the PUC's own preferences. While other parties may challenge a PUC's decision in court, courts are unlikely to overturn a PUC's judgment about cost allocation.³⁰

Third, the utility may exploit its informational advantages and intentionally provide false information. A rate case is premised on detailed accounting records filed by the utility about the expenses it incurs to provide service. The spreadsheets and other information that the utility files are based on internal records not available to the PUC or rate-case parties. Even if the utility provides some of its records in response to a party's request, the information might be too voluminous for the PUC or other parties to verify. Ultimately, the PUC relies on the utility's good faith. However, recent cases show that utilities are filing fabricated or misleading records.³¹

A random audit of multi-state utility company FirstEnergy by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) found that the utility had hidden lobbying expenses tied to political corruption by mislabeling them as legitimate expenses in its accounting books. According to

the audit, the utility's internal controls had been "possibly obfuscated or circumvented to conceal or mislead as to the actual amounts, nature and purpose of the lobbying expenditures."³² The audit concluded that the utility's mislabeling allowed the inappropriate lobbying expenses to be included in rates.³³ Rate cases did not detect this deception. Only an audit, informed by an extensive federal sting operation, revealed the utility's deceit. Regulators have recently uncovered other utilities filing false or misleading information in regulated proceedings.³⁴

Once the regulators approve utility rates, some consumers can shift costs to other ratepayers by fine-tuning their energy consumption. As we discuss in more detail in part II.B.3, rates for commercial and industrial ratepayers typically include demand charges that are tied to each consumer's energy consumption during the utility's or regional power system's moment of peak demand that year. By anticipating when that peak will happen and reducing consumption of utility-delivered power at that moment, a data center or other energy-intensive consumer can substantially reduce its bill. While this "peak shaving" can reduce power prices for other consumers, it also forces other ratepayers to pay part of the energy-intensive consumer's share of infrastructure costs.

Despite its flaws, ratemaking continues to be the dominant approach to financing power sector infrastructure. Uniform, stable prices provide predictable revenue that motivates investors to fund utility expansion. Rate regulation typically insulates investors from many ordinary business risks by putting ratepayers on the hook for the company's engineering, construction, or procurement mistakes. For instance, regulators often allow utilities to increase rates when their projects are over-budget. The utility rarely faces financial consequences for missteps that would cause businesses that rely on competitive markets to lose profits.

Some energy-intensive consumers can be exempted from this ratemaking process that socializes costs and shifts risks to the public. The special rates for these consumers are set in one-off agreements that can lock in long-term prices and shield it from risks faced by other ratepayers. These contracts, which typically require PUC approval, allow an individual consumer to take service under conditions and terms not otherwise available to anyone else. Special rates are, in essence, "a discriminatory action, but one that regulators can justify under certain conditions."³⁵

To protect ratepayers, some state laws authorizing special contracts require PUCs to evaluate whether the contract meets the cost causation standard.³⁶ However, the "notorious disagreements" about how to measure whether a consumer is paying for its costs of service still plague the special-contract cost causation analysis. And, as we describe

below, proceedings about special contracts present unique obstacles to evaluating cost causation.

In other states, however, laws authorizing special contracts do not prevent PUCs from approving below-cost contracts. For instance, Kansas law allows regulators to approve special rates if it determines that the rate is in the state's best interest based on multiple factors, including economic development, local employment, and tax revenues.³⁷ A recent law enacted in Mississippi strips utility regulators of any authority to review contracts between a utility and a data center.³⁸

Regardless of the standard for reviewing special contracts, there is significant political pressure on regulators to approve these deals, even if such development results in higher electricity costs for other ratepayers. Regulators do not want to be seen as the veto point for an economic development opportunity, which may have already been publicized by the company and the governor. Because utilities may be competing for the profitable opportunity to serve a particular energy-intensive consumer, they have an incentive to offer low prices, even if that reduced rate results in higher costs for the utility's other ratepayers. As noted, despite their wealth, Big Tech companies seek low energy prices and make siting decisions based in part on price.³⁹ Regulatory scrutiny of special contracts is therefore a critical backstop for protecting ratepayers.

II. How Data Center Costs Creep into Ratepayers' Bills

When a utility expands its system in anticipation of growing consumer demand, it typically seeks to include the capital costs of new infrastructure in its rates. If approved, ratepayers share the costs of the utility's expansion pursuant to a cost allocation formula accepted by the PUC. This approach, while imperfect for the reasons described in the previous section, has facilitated population growth and economic development by forcing ratepayers to subsidize new infrastructure that will allow new residents and businesses to receive utility-delivered energy.

For many utilities, their expectations about growth are now dominated by new data centers. Rather than being dispersed across a utility's service territory like homes and businesses, these new data center consumers that are benefitting from utility expansion are identifiable and capable of paying for infrastructure that will directly serve their facilities. If PUCs allow utilities to follow the conventional approach of socializing system expansion, utilities will impose data centers' energy costs on the public. The easiest way for utilities to shift data centers' energy costs to the public is to simply follow long-standing practices in rate cases.

In our view, however, utilities are often using more subtle ratemaking methods to push data centers' energy costs onto consumers' bills.

In this section, we focus on three mechanisms that can force consumers to pay for data center's energy costs. First, special contracts between utilities and data centers, approved through opaque regulatory processes, are transferring data center costs to other consumers. Second, disconnected processes for setting federally regulated transmission and wholesale power rates and state-set consumer prices are: A) causing consumers to pay for interstate infrastructure needed to accommodate new data centers; B) putting consumers on the hook for new infrastructure built for data-center load that never materializes; and C) allowing data centers to strategically reduce energy usage during a few hours to reduce their bills and shift costs to other consumers. Third, data centers that bypass traditional utility ratemaking by contracting directly with power generators may also be raising electricity prices for the public. These co-location agreements between a data center and adjacent non-utility generator may trigger an increase in power market prices and distort regulated electricity delivery rates.

A. Shifting Costs through Secret Contracts

Special contracts are offered by utilities to energy-intensive consumers to attract their business. While regulators in many states are required to protect the public from such cutthroat practices that harm ratepayers, we explain in this section why we are skeptical about utility claims that special contracts for data centers do not force the public to pay for Big Tech's energy costs.

Our review of 40 state PUC proceedings about special contracts with data centers finds that regulators frequently approve special contracts in short and conclusory orders. While PUC rate case decisions are lengthy documents that engage with the evidence filed by the utilities and other parties, most PUC orders approving special contracts provide only cursory analysis of the utility's proposal. One challenge for PUCs is that few, if any, parties participate in these proceedings. As a result, the PUC has little or no evidence in the record to compete with the utility's claim that the contract isolates data center energy costs from other ratepayers' bills.

The PUC often deters parties from arguing against the utility's proposed special contract by reflexively granting utility requests to shield its proposal from public view.⁴⁰ The PUC's own grant of confidentiality adds a procedural barrier to greater participation and prevents the public from even attempting to calculate the potential costs of these deals.⁴¹ But perhaps the greater impediment to third-party analysis of proposed special contracts is that

ratepayers believe that they have little at stake in the proceedings. Unlike rate cases, which set the prices consumers pay, a special contract will only have indirect financial effects on other ratepayers if it shifts costs that the energy-intensive customer ought to pay on to other ratepayers' bills. Because meaningfully participating in a special contract case has a high cost and a generally low reward, otherwise interested parties have typically not bothered to contest them. But the scale of data center special contracts demands attention because the costs being shifted to the public could be staggering.

A special contract shifts costs to other ratepayers when the customer pays the utility a price lower than the utility's costs to serve that customer. To cover the shortfall, utilities will attempt to raise rates for other ratepayers in a subsequent rate case.⁴² The amount of the shortfall, and whether there is any shortfall at all, depends on how the utility calculates its costs of providing service to the data center. As discussed above, there are "notorious disagreements" about appropriate methodologies, and even the term "cost" can itself be subject to dispute. Experts debate, for instance, when to use average or marginal costs and whether short- or long-term costs are suitable metrics. When utilities use one metric in a rate case and another metric in a special contract proceeding, they could be causing spillover effects that harm ratepayers.⁴³

The disagreements about methodologies and complexities of the calculations underscore a foundational challenge to reviewing a special contract rate. As discussed above, PUC rate case decisions do not purport to assign utility costs to individual consumers but instead apportion cost responsibility among similar ratepayers grouped together as classes. But in a special contract proceeding, the utility makes the unusual claim that it can isolate its costs to serve a single consumer. Without contrary evidence filed by interested parties, the PUC may have little basis for rejecting the utility's analysis.

Even without the benefit of third-party analyses in special contract proceedings, PUC orders may summarize cross-subsidy concerns raised by their own staff. But challenging the utility's analysis is costly and time-intensive, and staff may not have the resources to provide robust analysis. Similarly, state ratepayer advocates occasionally participate in these proceedings and raise cross subsidy arguments, but they are also often stretched too thin to provide a detailed response to the utility's proposal. As a result, we find that many PUC orders approving special contracts simply conclude that the proposed contract is reasonable without meaningfully engaging with the proposal.⁴⁴

Such PUC orders are therefore not persuasive in assuaging concerns that the public may be subsidizing Big Tech's energy costs. Moreover, as discussed, state regulators may face political pressure not to veto a significant construction project in the state. The utility's

assertion that it is protecting other ratepayers may provide enough cover for regulators to approve a special contract. The obscurity and complexity of these proceedings provides utilities with opportunities to hide data center energy costs and force them onto other consumers' bills.

Recent litigation against Duke Energy, one of the largest utilities in the country, exposed that the company was acting on its incentive to shift costs of a special contract to its other ratepayers. Duke's scheme responded to a new power plant developer offering competitive contracts to supply small non-profit utilities that had been purchasing power from Duke.⁴⁵ Duke's internal documents disclosed through litigation revealed that the new company was far more efficient than Duke and the utility therefore could not compete for customers based on price. Nonetheless, Duke offered one of its larger customers a new contract that amounted to a \$325 million discount compared to its existing deal with Duke.⁴⁶ Additional internal utility documents revealed that Duke developed a plan to "shift the cost of the discount" to its other ratepayers by raising their rates.⁴⁷ Duke's strategy to force its ratepayers to subsidize the special-contract customer's energy was discovered only because the power plant developer sued Duke in federal court under antitrust law.

While our paper focuses on how consumers are likely subsidizing Big Tech's energy costs through their utility rates, we acknowledge that the reverse is also theoretically possible. A data center taking service under special contracts could be *overpaying*. A utility proposing a special contract might prefer to overcharge one deep-pocketed customer through a special contract in order to reduce rates for the public. While this pricing strategy may seem politically attractive for the utility and PUC, it seems unlikely to attract new data centers.

Regardless of a utility's motivation, regulators are supposed to be skeptical of a sudden surge in utility spending. Superficial reviews of special contracts are insufficient when they are collectively committing utilities to billions of dollars for Big Tech customers. The recent Duke litigation illustrates how utilities take advantage of their monopolies to force ratepayers into subsidizing their competitive lines of businesses. Discounted rates can give a utility an edge in the data center market,⁴⁸ and hiding the costs of discounts in ratepayers' bills boosts utility profits. To prevent utilities from overcharging captive ratepayers for the benefit of their competitive businesses, both PUCs and FERC have developed regulatory mechanisms that attempt to prevent such subsidies.⁴⁹ For instance, FERC applies special scrutiny to contracts between utilities and power plants that are owned by the same corporate parent. FERC's concern is that because state regulators must let the utility recover its FERC-regulated costs in consumer's rates, "such sales could be made at a rate that is too

high, which would give an undue profit to the affiliated [power plant] at the expense of the franchised public utility's captive customers.”⁵⁰

Special contracts with data centers are the latest iteration of a long-standing problem with monopolist utilities. Policing cost-shifts in this context is particularly challenging due to the opaque nature of the proceedings, the complexity and subjectivity of assessing the utility's costs of serving an a single consumer, and political pressure on PUCs to approve contracts.

B. Shifting Costs through the Gap Between Federal and State Regulation

When a PUC approves a utility's revenue requirement, it must allow the utility to include interstate transmission and wholesale power market costs that are regulated by FERC.⁵¹ In much of the country, utilities procure power through markets administered by non-profit corporations called Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). Market prices are influenced by a host of factors, such as fuel and technology costs, and ultimately reflect generation supply and consumer demand. If supply is constrained by a data center demand surge, market prices would likely increase, at least in the short term. Consumers' utility bills will include these higher power market prices.

PUCs can protect ratepayers from market price increases by allocating the costs of higher prices to data centers. But PUCs rarely order utilities to adjust the formulae that spread FERC-regulated market and transmission costs to ratepayers. In this section, we illustrate how ratepayers can pay more for power due to data center demand by focusing on FERC-regulated transmission costs. Federal law provides FERC with exclusive authority to set utilities' transmission revenue requirements and allocate a utility's transmission revenue requirement to multiple utilities. Under FERC's rules, costs of a new transmission line can be paid entirely by a single utility or shared among utilities if there is agreement that the new line benefits multiple utilities. When costs are shared, a region-specific formula approved by FERC divides costs roughly in proportion to the power system benefits each utility receives, such as lower market prices and improved reliability.⁵²

Under either the single-utility or multi-utility approach, PUCs apply their own formula for dividing FERC-allocated transmission costs among ratepayer classes. These separate cost allocation schemes can allow data center energy costs to creep into other consumers' bills when new data centers trigger a need for transmission upgrades. We illustrate by discussing examples of each type of transmission cost recovery and then explain how rate designs embedded in special contracts or tariffs can allow data centers to reduce their bills at the expense of ratepayers.

1. Separate Federal and PUC Transmission Cost Allocation Methods Allow Data Center Infrastructure Costs to Infiltrate Ratepayers' Bills

In December 2023, the PJM RTO, a utility alliance stretching from New Jersey to Chicago and south to North Carolina, approved \$5 billion of transmission projects whose costs would be shared based among PJM's utility members.⁵³ PJM identified two factors driving the need for this transmission expansion: retirement of existing generation resources and "unprecedented data center load growth," primarily in Virginia.⁵⁴ Pursuant to its FERC-approved cost allocation method, PJM split half of the transmission costs across its footprint based on each utilities' share of regional power demand and allocated the remaining half using a computer simulation of the regional transmission network that estimates benefits each utility receives from the new transmission projects.⁵⁵ Under this approach, PJM assigned approximately half of the total cost to Virginia utilities, approximately 10% to Maryland utilities, and the remainder to utilities across the region.⁵⁶

Each state's PUC then allocates the costs assigned by PJM to ratepayer classes of each utility it regulates. In Maryland, across the state's three IOUs assign, an average of 66 percent of transmission costs are assigned to residential ratepayers.⁵⁷ The larger of Virginia's two IOUs includes more than half of its transmission costs in residential rates.⁵⁸ Thus, in both states, residential ratepayers are paying the majority of regional transmission costs that are tied to data center growth. From the public's perspective, this result appears to violate the cost causation principle. After all, residential ratepayers are not causing PJM to plan new transmission.

PJM's approach, however, recognizes that new regional transmission benefits all ratepayers by improving reliability, allowing for more efficient delivery of power, and providing other power system improvements that are broadly shared. PJM developed its cost-sharing approach with the understanding that new transmission would be designed primarily to provide public benefits. New transmission designed for a few energy-intensive consumers, and not broad public benefits, is inconsistent with PJM's premise. That said, by increasing transmission capacity, new regional transmission lines for data centers may provide ancillary benefits to all ratepayers. PJM's power system simulation, which it uses to allocate half the costs of transmission expansion, demonstrates the shared benefits of this new infrastructure. Proponents of transmission expansion argue that such power flow models validate the current approach of allocating transmission costs to benefiting ratepayers because the models can calculate with reasonable accuracy who benefits from new transmission and therefore who should pay for it.

But even assuming that ancillary benefits for all ratepayers are adequate to justify current methods for regional transmission cost allocation, PJM only spreads costs among the region's utilities. Each utility then has its own methods, approved by PUCs, for allocating transmission investment to its ratepayers. The PUC-approved methods typically presume that ratepayers share in the benefits of new transmission in proportion to their total energy consumption. This approach causes residential ratepayers in Maryland, which consume more than half of the state's electricity, to pay for the lion's share of Maryland utilities' costs of new PJM-planned transmission. Without reforms, consumers will be paying billions of dollars for regional infrastructure that is designed to address the needs of just a few of the world's wealthiest corporations.⁵⁹

Obsolete PUC cost allocation formulas can also cause ratepayers to pay for transmission costs that are not regionally shared. For instance, in July 2024, Virginia's largest utility applied to the PUC for permission to build infrastructure that would serve a new large data center. PUC staff reviewing the proposal found that but for the data center's request, the project "likely, if not certainly, would not be needed at this time."⁶⁰ In its application, the utility told state regulators that the \$23 million project would be paid for through its FERC-approved transmission tariff.⁶¹ Under the utility's existing state-approved tariff, about half of all costs assigned through the FERC-regulated tariff are billed to residential ratepayers, and the remaining half are billed to other existing ratepayers.⁶² The bottom line is that existing tariffs force the public to foot the bill for the data center's transmission.

2. Utilities May Be Saddling Ratepayers with Stranded Costs for Unneeded Transmission

If a utility's data center growth projections fail to materialize, ratepayers could be left paying for transmission that the utility constructed in anticipation of data center development. Claiming that it was addressing this "stranded cost" issue, American Electric Power (AEP) of Ohio proposed a new state-regulated tariff that that would require data center customers to enter into long-term contracts with the utility before receiving service. AEP's proposed contract would require the data center to pay 90 percent of costs associated with its maximum demand for a ten-year period, including FERC-regulated transmission costs.⁶³ According to the utility, this upfront guarantee protects AEP's other ratepayers from the risk that the utility builds new infrastructure for a data center that never materializes and prevents the utility from offloading all of these "stranded" costs on other ratepayers.

While these long-term contracts would at least partially insulate AEP's ratepayers from data center transmission costs, neighboring utilities pointed out that they could still be left paying

for stranded costs through PJM's allocation of transmission investments. Their protests explain that if AEP builds new transmission lines in anticipation of data center load growth, and those lines are paid for via PJM's regional cost allocation, then those costs would be split among all PJM-member utilities. As noted, PJM allocates half the costs of new transmission lines to its utility members based on their share of regional energy sales. If AEP's data center customers commence operations, AEP's own share of regional transmission costs would increase in proportion to its rising share of regional energy sales. In that scenario, other utilities in the region may not overpay for transmission needed for AEP's data center customers.

Protesting utilities in the Ohio PUC proceeding focus on the possibility that AEP's data center customers cancel their projects or consume less energy than anticipated after AEP has spent money developing new transmission to meet projected data center demand.⁶⁴ Under that scenario, total regional transmission costs would rise due to AEP's spending, but AEP's share of total costs would not increase proportionally. As a result, other regional utilities would face increasing costs to pay for infrastructure developed to meet AEP's unrealized data center energy demand. How much individual consumers pay for the new infrastructure would depend on how each utility allocates transmission costs to various ratepayer classes pursuant to a PUC rate case decision.

New transmission projects paid for by a single utility can also raise stranded cost concerns. In December 2024, FERC approved a contract that governed the construction of transmission facilities needed to provide service to a new data center.⁶⁵ Under the contract, the data center will immediately pay for new infrastructure needed to connect the facility to the existing transmission network but will not directly pay for necessary upgrades to existing transmission facilities. Instead, the utility AES pledged to include those upgrade costs in the transmission rates paid by all ratepayers through a subsequent regulatory process. A separate state-regulated tariff for energy-intensive consumers would require the data center, and not other consumers, to ultimately pay for the upgrades. In addition, the contract requires the data center to pay for the upgrades in the event it does not commence operations or uses less energy than would be required under the state-regulated tariff to pay for the upgrades over the time. Our understanding is that this approach to transmission cost recovery for new energy-intensive consumers is fairly common and not limited to data centers, but ratepayer advocates are concerned that data centers' commitments may be more uncertain than other types of energy-intensive consumers.

The Ohio ratepayer advocate therefore protested the contract, arguing that the language protecting other consumers from paying for the transmission upgrades was "unacceptably

ambiguous.”⁶⁶ The Ohio advocate urged FERC to require “specific language to preclude shifting data center costs” to other consumers.⁶⁷ FERC nonetheless approved the contract because it found that these concerns were premature and noted that they may be raised in future proceedings that directly address any proposed cost shifts.⁶⁸ In a short concurrence, FERC Commissioner Mark Christie questioned whether the rate treatment proposed by the utility that could burden consumers with stranded costs is justified.

3. By Slightly Reducing Their Energy Use, Data Centers Can Increase Ratepayers’ Transmission and Wholesale Market Charges

Like other ratepayers, data centers pay an energy price for each unit of energy they consume as well as a monthly flat fee. Data centers, and many non-residential ratepayers, also face utility-imposed demand charges that are tied to their peak consumption during a specified month, year, or other time period. These charges are intended to reflect the costs of building power systems that have sufficient capacity to generate and deliver energy when consumer demand is unusually high. In RTO regions, PUC-regulated data center special contracts and tariffs likely reflect FERC-approved demand charges that incorporate regional transmission costs and may also include costs of procuring sufficient power plant capacity to meet peak demand. By reducing their energy use during just a few hours of the year, data centers may be able to reduce their share of regional costs that are allocated to demand charges and effectively force other ratepayers to pick up the tab.

Electricity use is constantly changing, and it peaks when consumers ramp up cooling and heating systems during exceptionally hot or cold days. Meeting these moments of peak demand is very expensive. Consumers pay for transmission and power plant infrastructure that is mostly unused but nonetheless necessary for providing power during a few peak hours each year. While utilities have employed several methods for assessing demand charges, many energy-intensive consumers are billed based on their own consumption at the moment the regional system reaches its peak demand.⁶⁹

Data centers and other large energy users have significant incentives to forecast when this peak hour will occur and reduce their consumption of utility-delivered power during that hour. To avoid shutting down or reducing their production during hours when the system might hit its peak, energy-intensive consumers may install backup generators that displace utility-provided power. Large power users may already have their own power generators to protect against outages or improve the quality of utility-delivered power.⁷⁰ Needless to say, most consumers that face demand charges, such as small businesses, do not have a sufficient incentive to forecast the system peaks or install on-site generation. As data

centers' share of regional energy consumption grows, Big Tech will be able to shift an increasingly large share of the region's costs to other ratepayers, particularly if their demand charges are easily manipulable.

PUCs can often prevent these cost shifts among consumers who take service from rate-regulated utilities in their states. Federal law requires only that the total costs allocated through FERC-approved tariffs must be passed on to utilities and then ultimately to consumers through PUC-regulated tariffs or special contracts. PUCs can choose their own methods for allocating those costs among ratepayers. Because data centers' special contracts are confidential, we often do not know whether utilities and PUCs are facilitating cost shifts through demand charges. Whether data centers are taking service under tariffs or special contracts, PUCs should ensure that rate structures are not allowing data centers to shift costs through manipulable demand charges.

That said, as we discuss below in part III.E, cutting peak consumption can reduce costs for everyone if utilities build their systems for a lower peak that accounts for a data center's ability to turn off or self-power. The problem is that utilities are expanding based on an assumption that data centers will operate at full power with utility-delivered power during peak periods. When a data center uses its own generation during peak periods to avoid demand charges, it is shifting the costs of an overbuilt system to the public.

C. Shifting Costs by “Co-Locating” Data Centers and Existing Power Plants

Power plant owners have developed their own scheme for attracting data centers that could shift energy costs from data centers to ratepayers. Under “co-location” arrangements, a data center connects directly to an existing power plant behind the plant's point of interconnection to the utility-owned transmission network. By delivering and taking power without using the transmission network, power plant owners and data centers argue that they ought to be exempt from paying utility-assessed energy delivery fees. Utilities have contested this arrangement because it denies them profitable opportunities to build new infrastructure to connect data centers to their networks.

In their haste to secure power as quickly as possible, data centers are looking to contract with existing generation, particularly nuclear power plants. By connecting directly to a power plant, data centers aim to avoid a potentially lengthy process administered by a utility to connect the data center to the utility's power delivery system. Locating load behind a power plant's point of delivery to the transmission network is not new. But the potential scale of data center growth and possibility that some significant share of that growth will co-locate has spawned disputes between power plant owners and utilities.

We highlight the key points about co-location by focusing on regulatory proceedings that involve Constellation, the largest owner of nuclear plants in the U.S., and Exelon, the largest utility in the U.S. that owns only delivery infrastructure and not power plants. Until 2022, Constellation and Exelon were housed under the same corporate parent. The company's restructuring into separate generation and delivery companies allows each of those businesses to independently pursue policies that best meet their financial interests. Data center growth began to rapidly escalate shortly thereafter and has revealed tensions between utilities and companies that compete in wholesale electricity markets for profits.

Co-location is a vague term. Because financial consequences will follow from any regulatory definition of co-location, utilities and power generators dispute how co-location technically functions. Constellation claims that because a data center co-located with one of its nuclear plants cannot receive power from the grid, it is therefore "fully isolated" from the transmission network.⁷¹ Exelon counters that "as a matter of physics and engineering," the co-located data center is "fully integrated with the electric grid."⁷² Utilities and other parties point out that a nuclear plant must operate in sync with the other plants connected to the transmission network and claim that the data center benefits from this arrangement even if the transmission system is not delivering power to it.⁷³

This technical distinction could affect whether co-located entities are utility ratepayers that pay for delivery service. Constellation argues that because the utility is not delivering energy to the data center, the data center is not a utility customer, and it should not have to pay any FERC- or PUC-regulated delivery charges. Exelon opposes that result and has estimated that a single proposed co-location arrangement between a nuclear owner and a data center would shift between \$58 million and \$140 million of transmission and state-regulated distribution charges to other ratepayers.⁷⁴

But Constellation and other generators dispute that calculation, claiming that this "phantom . . . 'cost shift' is, at best, merely a back-of-the-envelope estimate" of the revenue a utility would collect if the data center signed up as its customer.⁷⁵ Co-location, according to the nuclear plant owners, does not actually cause other ratepayers to pay higher transmission rates but instead precludes them from receiving lower delivery rates that they might pay when a new energy-intensive customer becomes a utility ratepayer and pays its proportional share of the utility's cost of service (a hypothetical that likely does not occur when the new customer receives a one-off price pursuant to a special contract).

But analysts are concerned that co-location can actually raise prices in interstate power markets. Across much of the country, generators are constantly competing through auction markets to supply power. In a few regions, market operators conduct separate annual,

monthly, or seasonal auctions for capacity to procure sufficient resources for meeting peak consumer demand. Each power plant can offer capacity into the auction equivalent to its maximum potential for energy generation. In the PJM region, nuclear plants accounted for 21 percent of total capacity that cleared the most recent auction.⁷⁶

PJM's independent market monitor, who fiercely promotes and defends PJM's markets, recently warned that colocation could "undermine" PJM's markets. He posited that if all nuclear plants in the region attracted co-located customers, "the impact on the PJM grid and markets would be extreme. Power flows on the grid that was built in significant part to deliver low-cost nuclear energy to load would change significantly. Energy prices would increase significantly as low-cost nuclear energy is displaced by higher cost energy . . . Capacity prices would increase as the supply of capacity to the market is reduced."⁷⁷ Should this scenario play out, the region's ratepayers could be forced to pay higher prices due to data centers' purchasing decisions. However, as noted, steep increases in demand due to data center growth could increase wholesale market prices regardless of whether data centers co-locate with existing power plants.

For utilities, opposing co-location is not purely about protecting their ratepayers or upholding the integrity of interstate markets. Co-location threatens their control over power delivery by allowing data centers to take energy directly from a large power producer. In some states, utilities might claim that state laws prohibit co-location because they provide the utility with a monopoly on retail sales.⁷⁸ Co-location would also reduce the profits that utilities would otherwise stand to gain from constructing new infrastructure to serve data centers.

In an ongoing FERC proceeding, Constellation claims that utilities' opposition to co-location is an anti-competitive ploy to capitalize on their state-granted monopolies.⁷⁹ The company alleges that co-location arrangements at two of its nuclear plants are "being held hostage by one or two monopoly utilities . . . [that] have taken the law into their own hands, and are unilaterally blocking co-location projects unless the future data center customers accede to utility demands to take [] transmission services . . . from the utility and sign up for retail distribution services."⁸⁰ Utilities may be trying to delay Constellation's projects until FERC provides clear guidance on co-location arrangements, including whether data centers and nuclear plants will pay any transmission charges.⁸¹

Even if FERC sets new rules the two sides are likely to continue squabbling about the details. With billions of dollars on the line, each side might have an incentive to litigate, which would add risk to co-location schemes.

III. Recommendations for State Regulators and Legislators: Strategies for Protecting Consumers from Big Tech’s Power Costs

Without systematic changes to prevailing utility ratemaking practices, the public faces significant risks that utilities will take advantage of opportunities to profit from new data centers by making major investments and then shifting costs to their captive ratepayers. The industry’s current approaches of luring data centers with discounted contracts or lopsided tariffs are unsustainable.

We outline five recommendations for PUCs to better protect consumers from subsidizing Big Tech’s data centers: A) establishing guidelines for reviewing special contracts, B) shifting new data centers from special contracts to tariffs, C) facilitating competition and the development of “energy parks” that are not connected to any utility-owned network, D) requiring utilities to provide more frequent demand forecasts, and E) allowing new data centers to take service only if they commit to flexible operations.

A. Establish Robust Guidelines for Reviewing Special Contracts

PUCs rarely reject proposed special contracts with data centers. As we discussed, many states’ laws provide PUCs with broad discretion to approve special contracts, do not specify a particular standard of review, and even allow the PUC to approve a contract that shifts costs to other ratepayers. Given the unprecedented scale and pace of data center special contracts, PUCs should establish more rigorous guidelines for reviewing special contracts that are aimed at protecting consumers.

In Kentucky, the Public Service Commission must make several findings on the record before approving a special contract.⁸² Under the PSC’s self-imposed guidelines, special contracts that include discounts are allowed only when the utility has excess generation capacity. The guidelines limit discounts to five years and no more than half the duration of the contract. The PSC must also find that the contract rate exceeds the utility’s marginal costs to serve that customer and that the contract requires the customer to pay any of the utility’s fixed costs associated with providing service to that customer.

Applying its guidelines, the PSC recently rejected a utility’s proposed special contract with a cryptocurrency speculator because it found the contract did not shield consumers from the crypto venture’s power costs.⁸³ The PSC was critical of the utility’s projections about regional market and transmission prices and therefore did not find credible the utility’s claim that the contract would cover the utility’s cost to provide energy to the crypto speculator. Industrial

ratepayers, several environmental and local NGOs, and Kentucky's attorney general, acting on behalf of consumers, participated in the proceeding and criticized the proposed contract.

While the PSC's guidelines compel it to address vital consumer protection issues, the rule cannot force regulators to critically analyze the utilities' filing or prevent the PSC from merely rubber-stamping a utility's proposed special contract. Vigorous oversight cannot be mandated by law: it requires dedicated public servants. The effectiveness of any consumer protection guidelines depends on the people who implement it, including PUC staff that review utility proposals and the commissioners who make the ultimate decisions.

Nonetheless, we believe that establishing guidelines that require regulators to make specific findings about a proposed special contract would improve upon the status quo.

B. Require New Data Centers to Take Service Under Tariffs

Special contracts are vehicles for shifting special interests' energy costs to consumers. Approved in confidential proceedings by PUCs facing political pressure to approve deals and often with no competing interests participating, special contracts allow utilities to take advantage of the subjectivity and complexity of their accounting practices to socialize energy-intensive customers' costs to the public. The existing guardrails that ostensibly allow regulators to police special contracts are not working to protect consumers.

Guided by their consumer-protection mandate, regulators should stop approving any special contracts and instead require utilities to serve data centers through tariffs that offer standard terms and conditions for all future data-center customers. Unlike a one-off special contract that provides each data center with unique terms and conditions, a tariff ensures that all data centers pay under the same terms and that the impact of new customers is addressed by considering the full picture of the utility's costs and revenue. This holistic and uniform approach ends the race-to-the-bottom competition that incentivizes utilities to attract customers by offering hidden discounts paid for by other ratepayers.

That said, standard tariffs are not a talisman for protecting consumers. As we have emphasized, cost allocation is an imprecise exercise that depends on myriad assumptions and projections. However, tariff proceedings and rate cases are more procedurally appropriate forums than a special contract case to consider and address cost-allocation issues. Unlike special contracts, tariffs are reviewed in open dockets that allow the public and interested parties to scrutinize proposals and understand long-term implications of proposed rates should they go into effect. Once approved, a data-center tariff can be revisited in subsequent rate cases where the utility proposes to increase rates and allocate

its costs among ratepayers, including data centers. All ratepayers will have an incentive to participate in those cases and offer evidence that challenge data centers' interests.

Several utilities have already been moving away from special contracts to tariffs. Recent and ongoing proceedings are highlighting issues that demand careful scrutiny, including whether to create new data-center-only tariffs and how to protect existing ratepayers from costs of new infrastructure needed to meet data centers' demands. We briefly canvas these issues.

A threshold issue is whether an existing utility tariff for energy-intensive ratepayers is appropriate for data centers or whether a new tariff is necessary to address issues that are unique to data centers. Ratepayer classes are generally defined by the similar costs that the utility incurs to serve members of that class. Data centers may, of course, oppose new tariffs that impose more expensive prices than they would pay if they took service under existing tariffs for energy-intensive ratepayers.

In Ohio, for instance, AEP proposed to create classes for new data centers and cryptocurrency speculators and require ratepayers in those classes to commit to higher upfront charges and for a longer period of time than other energy-intensive consumers.⁸⁴ To justify the new data center class, AEP argued that data centers' unique size at individual locations and in the aggregate, as well as uncertainty about their energy use over the long-term and minimal employment opportunities, distinguish data centers from other energy-intensive consumers.⁸⁵ Data center companies responded that AEP had "failed to justify its approach to exclusively target data centers" and claimed that the utilities' costs to serve data centers was no different from other energy-intensive consumers that operate around the clock.⁸⁶ As of February 2025, the Ohio PUC has yet to rule on AEP's proposal.

FERC addressed similar issues in August 2024 when a utility proposed a new ratepayer class for energy-intensive cryptocurrency operations. Like AEP, the utility claimed that significant but uncertain demand growth justified approval of the new rate class, and therefore higher upfront payment commitments and longer terms for this new customer class were appropriate.⁸⁷ According to the utility, crypto speculators can more easily relocate their operations as compared to other energy-intensive consumers, and this mobility amplifies the risk of stranded assets built for new crypto customers that quickly set up shop elsewhere. FERC rejected the proposal because it found that the utility had provided insufficient evidence that new crypto operations "pose a greater stranded asset risk than other loads of similar size."⁸⁸ FERC's finding does not foreclose a utility from creating a crypto or data center ratepayer class, but instead signals that FERC will demand more persuasive evidence to justify approval of a new class.

State legislatures could remove any evidentiary hurdles by requiring large data centers to be in their own ratepayer class. With large data centers in their own class, regulators could more easily understand the effects data centers have on other ratepayers. For instance, parties might introduce evidence in a rate case showing how various cost allocation methods that raise costs for data centers would lower costs for other ratepayers. To avoid any claims of undue discrimination, the new rate class might include any new consumer above a specified capacity threshold that, as a practical matter, would likely capture only data centers.

Separating large data centers from other ratepayers could facilitate more protective cost allocation methods that better isolate data center costs from other ratepayers. Again, state legislatures might have a role to play. In Virginia, a bill proposed in January 2025 would require state regulators to determine whether cost allocation methods “unreasonably subsidize” data centers and to minimize or eliminate any such subsidies.⁸⁹ Such clear language would provide the PUC with guidance as it balances its obligations to protect ratepayers and facilitate growth in the state. In addition, it would force PUCs to revisit decades-old methods for dividing FERC-regulated transmission costs, as we discuss above.

As data centers shift to new tariffs, the largest potential cost shift in many states could be from the costs of new power plants built to meet data center growth. In most states, utilities are the dominant generation owners and can earn a PUC-set rate of return that they collect from ratepayers on their investments in new power plants. In general, utility expenses on new power plants are spread among ratepayer classes under the theory that all ratepayers benefit from the utility’s power plants. But the staggering power demands of data centers defy this assumption. Recent tariff proceedings highlight that many utilities are proposing schemes that are not adequately shielding ratepayers from the costs of new generation for data center growth.

In Indiana, the utility Indiana Michigan Power expects new data centers to increase the peak demand on its system from 2,800 to 7,000 megawatts.⁹⁰ To facilitate this growth, the utility proposed to create special terms for new customers that demand at least 150 megawatts of power, a threshold that in practice limits their applicability to new data centers.⁹¹ Like AEP Ohio’s proposal, the updated tariff would require a new data center to commit to paying 90 percent of the utility’s costs of new generation and transmission capacity needed to meet the data center’s demand.⁹² This 90 percent capacity payment and the tariff’s twenty-year term, according to the utility, would “provide reasonable assurance” that data centers’ payments to the utility “will reasonably align with the cost of the significant investments and financial commitments the Company will make to provide service.”⁹³

Consumer advocates generally supported the utility's efforts to insulate ratepayers from data centers' energy costs but argued that the proposed terms were "insufficient for protecting existing customers from large potential cost shifts in the event of the closure" of a large data center.⁹⁴ One of their solutions was to "firewall" the costs of new power plants built to meet data center growth from other ratepayers by requiring the utility to separately procure or build generation for data centers, and then allocating all costs solely to data centers.⁹⁵ Consumer advocates also urged regulators to require other modifications related to contract termination and other provisions to protect ratepayers from stranded costs if data center growth failed to materialize or decreased following an initial spike.⁹⁶

Data center companies argued the other side, claiming that the terms were too onerous and benefited the utility shareholders who "would be shielded from business risk, while reaping regulated returns on large potentially more risky expansion of rate base" that would be backed by data centers.⁹⁷ Amazon observed that the utility's proposed twenty-year term is based on the ordinary approach to cost recovery of utility capital investments. But instead of the utility building its own plants and earning a return on them, Amazon claimed that the utility could more efficiently support data center growth through short-term contracts with non-utility generators or purchases via PJM's regional markets.⁹⁸ Amazon argued that rather than "imposing virtually all risks" associated with power plant development on data centers and reaping all of the profits for itself, the utility should instead share the risks of infrastructure development with new data centers.⁹⁹

The Indiana proceeding highlights how utility ownership of generation can exacerbate cost shifts that benefit utility shareholders. The traditional utility business model of decades-long cost recovery of new utility-owned power plants through consumer rates is not designed to address a near-term tripling of a utility's demand due to just a few giant energy-guzzling warehouses. While "firewalling" data centers' power plant costs from other ratepayers is a viable approach, regulators must ensure that utility proposals actually protect consumers.

Under its "Clean Transition Tariff," Nevada Energy claims to insulate other ratepayers from data centers' energy generation costs by contracting with new clean energy resources and then passing those contract costs directly to a specific data center or other customer. In theory, this arrangement could isolate generation costs, but public utility staff and other intervenors concluded that the new tariff would not actually firewall data centers' generation costs from other ratepayers.¹⁰⁰ They found that complex interactions between the new tariff's proposed pricing structure and existing tariffs would shift costs to other ratepayers. For instance, PUC staff focused on the utility's proposal to account for the revenue it would have earned if the data center took service under a standard tariff and then charge other

ratepayers for a portion of its “lost” revenue.¹⁰¹ In February 2025, the utility agreed with intervenors to modify its proposal and defer consideration of some of these complicated cost allocation issues.¹⁰²

A better option for protecting ratepayers from power plant costs would be to allow data centers to purchase energy directly from non-utility retailers but still pay the utility for delivery service. Several states allow for such retail competition for energy-intensive consumers. To even further isolate data center energy costs, regulators could cut the cord entirely between the utility and data centers. Off-the-grid energy parks or energy parks that only export energy to the utility could completely insulate ratepayers from data centers’ energy costs.

C. Amend State Law to Require Retail Competition and Allow for Energy Parks

Competition can protect consumers from utility market power and insulate ratepayers from cost shifts. Starting in the 1970s, a few states began to allow limited competition for electricity service to certain energy-intensive consumers.¹⁰³ In the 1990s, about a dozen states permitted all ratepayers to shop for power supply while continuing to require them to pay state-regulated rates for utility-provided delivery service. Additional states allowed energy-intensive consumers to similarly choose a power supplier. To protect ratepayers, states could require new data centers to procure power through competitive processes rather than confining them to utility-supplied power. States could go further and allow or require new data centers to isolate entirely from the utility-owned network by creating new energy parks.

A mandate that new data centers procure power from non-utility suppliers would protect ratepayers from short-term costs and long-term risks. Requiring the data center to contract with a competitive supplier rather than with the utility would ensure that all stranded costs associated with the generation are allocated between the data center and its supplier. In addition, isolating the utility from the deal would obviate the need for the type of complex energy price calculations, integral to Nevada Energy’s proposal, that link the data center’s power price to the costs of the utility’s legacy assets.

The costs of utility-built power plants for data centers could be astronomical. In the Indiana proceeding discussed in the previous section, the utility’s own estimates revealed that if it met data center demand with self-built plants it could spend as much as \$17 billion on new power plants over the next several years.¹⁰⁴ The utility’s proposal to require data centers to commit to paying 90 percent of the infrastructure costs over a twenty-year period would

improve upon the status quo but would not completely isolate those costs from other ratepayers, particularly if data center demand did not meet the utility's forecasts.

Even with a state prohibition on new utility power plants for meeting data center demand, ratepayers could still face higher bills from cost shifts. A data center procuring energy from the market would still pay utility-imposed delivery charges that could obscure discounts for data centers or include various other cost shifts. Islanding the data center and its power supply from the utility-owned system is a sure-fire approach for protecting ratepayers.

An energy park, according to a recent paper by Energy Innovation, “combines generation assets, complementary resources like storage, and connected customers.”¹⁰⁵ Unlike typical behind-the-meter arrangements where a customer installs some on-site generation to complement utility-delivered power, an energy park would provide sufficient power for the connected customers' operations. This arrangement is “particularly compelling for large customers due to the cost advantages of sourcing electricity directly from the cheapest, cleanest sources and due to the challenges of connecting large capacities to the existing grid.”¹⁰⁶ Avoiding the protracted utility-run interconnection processes would be a benefit for Big Tech companies who tend to move faster than the lumbering utility industry.¹⁰⁷

A fool-proof way to insulate utility ratepayers from data center energy costs is to isolate a data center energy park from the utility-owned network. Isolation may be difficult, however, as an interconnected energy park could be more financially attractive to developers, even if it is only able to export power to the transmission system and unable to import utility-delivered power.¹⁰⁸ Connecting an energy park would require a utility-run interconnection process and would likely lead to the utility imposing transmission charges on the energy park. While transmission charges associated with an export-only energy park could facilitate cost shifts, they are likely to be much smaller than those embedded in special contracts and other arrangements for serving data centers with utility-delivered power that we have outlined in this paper.

Both competitive generation and energy park development face the same legal obstacle: state protection of utility monopolies. Under many states' laws, an entity that delivers or sells power to another entity is a “public utility.” For instance, if a generation company owns the park's generation assets and Big Tech company owns the data center, the generation company would be regulated as a public utility. This designation could doom the project. States typically prohibit competition for electric service and regulators and courts might enforce the state's monopoly protections by prohibiting a multi-owner energy park located within the territory assigned to the incumbent utility.¹⁰⁹ Even if a state allows the energy

park to move forward as a public utility, the PUC may be compelled to regulate its rates and terms of service in a way that render the project unviable.

One potential workaround is to locate an energy park outside a for-profit utility's service territory. But states' laws may nonetheless impose obstacles. In Georgia, for instance, state law allows a new energy-intensive consumer located outside existing utility service territories to choose a supplier but limits the premises to a single customer.¹¹⁰ An energy park in Georgia could therefore include only one data center owner. Energy parks might also be able to locate within the service territory of a municipal or cooperative utility. The service territories of these non-profit entities may not be protected by state law, or they may not be financially motivated to defend their monopolies and might instead welcome an energy park's investment in their communities.¹¹¹ That said, some non-profit utilities may regard an energy park as an infringement on their monopolies.¹¹²

State legislatures could amend anachronistic laws that prevent energy park development and block data centers taking utility service from procuring non-utility generation. To avoid interminable utility complaints that competition harms consumers,¹¹³ laws could be tailored to apply only to data centers or other energy-intensive consumers that would otherwise require a utility to incur significant costs to procure power or build new generation.

D. Require Utilities to Disclose Data Center Forecasts

For competition to be effective, market participants need information about potential data centers' location and power demands. When utilities withhold that information, they prevent generators and other infrastructure and technology developers from offering data centers solutions that compete with the utility's offering. PUCs could require utilities to file monthly or quarterly load forecasts, which would reduce utilities' informational advantages and better enable other companies to offer solutions that would protect ratepayers from a utility's ability to shift data centers' costs to other consumers.

In the AEP Ohio proceeding, a trade association representing non-utility companies that sell electricity to consumers uncovered that AEP was withholding information. It documented that the utility's demand forecasts it filed in prior proceedings were inconsistent with its projections about data center growth it revealed to justify its data center tariff proposal.¹¹⁴ The trade association's analyst explained that by holding back information AEP "conferred a *de facto* competitive advantage to build transmission rather than allowing a market response from competitive merchant generation" to meet data center demand.¹¹⁵ The analyst also conjectured that AEP's concealment might directly harm ratepayers if it delayed

development of generation that might be needed to meet growing regional demand, which could lead to increased prices in PJM's capacity auction.¹¹⁶

PUCs can order utilities to provide demand projections more frequently and specify that utilities include new energy-intensive consumers at various stages of development. Utilities could also provide potential locations and demands of new energy-intensive consumers with enough specificity to be useful to market participants but sufficiently obscured to protect consumers' potentially confidential business information. Because many utilities have substantially increased their demand forecasts over the past year,¹¹⁷ new reporting rules would be well justified as a means of protecting consumers, enabling competition, and ensuring reliability.

E. Allow New Data Centers to Take Service Only if They Commit to Flexible Operations that Can Reduce System Costs

State regulators could require utilities to condition service to new data centers on a commitment to flexible operations. This approach could benefit all ratepayers by avoiding or reducing the need for expensive infrastructure that would otherwise be needed when a new data center increases the utility's maximum demand. A study by researchers at the Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & Sustainability estimates that 76 GW of data centers could connect to the system if utilities curtail energy delivery for just a few hours per year.¹¹⁸

As discussed above, utilities and RTOs plan power system expansion to provide sufficient capacity for meeting consumers' maximum energy demand, which usually occurs on the hottest and coldest days of the year. Because the system is planned for these extreme weather days, a large portion of a power system's generation and delivery infrastructure is underutilized for most of the year. If a data center commits to reducing its consumption of utility-supplied power during peak demand periods, utilities could deliver power to the data center without building new infrastructure.

To implement a flexibility mandate, PUCs could order utilities to modify their tariffs and classify data center loads as interruptible customers whose power can be turned off under specified circumstances. Similarly, regulators could also require utilities to modify their interconnection procedures to designate data centers as controllable loads that must reduce their consumption under certain conditions.¹¹⁹ These strategies could defer the immediate need for costly infrastructure upgrades to serve new data centers. Utilities, however, have historically been hostile to regulatory attempts to require measures that would defer or avoid the need for costly infrastructure upgrades that drive utilities' profits.

IV. Subsidies Hidden in Utility Rates Extract Value from the Public

Utility rates have always been a means of achieving economic and energy policy goals. By financing favored investments through utility rates, rather than through general government revenue, policymakers can avoid having to raise taxes and instead conceal public spending through complex utility rate increases. From the public's perspective, hiding subsidies in utility rates may be acceptable if the benefits of the favored investments exceed their costs. For data centers deals, however, utilities do not publicly demonstrate that ratepayers pay lower rates as a result of the contract. To the extent data center development offers other benefits, such as expanding the local economy or advancing national security interests, we argue that these secondary effects are either already accounted for through other policies or irrelevant to utility regulators.

The economic harm to ratepayers from data center discounts extends beyond the short-term bill increases that utilities are imposing on the public. We are concerned that meeting data center demand is delaying opportunities to initiate power sector reforms that would benefit all ratepayers. To power new data centers, utilities are proposing more of the same: spending capital on large central-station power plants and transmission reinforcements. These types of projects have been fueling utility profits for generations, but the power sector today can do so much more. Deploying advanced technologies and adopting new operational and planning practices could squeeze more value from existing utility systems, but these low-capital-cost solutions are not profitable for utilities and therefore not pursued.¹²⁰ By approving special contracts for data centers and tariffs that do protect ratepayers from Big Tech's energy costs, PUCs may be inadvertently fostering an alliance between utilities and Big Tech that could reinforce the industry's technological status quo.

A. Data Center Subsidies Fail Traditional Benefit-Cost Tests

When a utility spends money to supply a new data center, the data center should pay for those investments. However, if ratepayers ultimately benefit from new infrastructure needed for a data center, it may be reasonable for the utility to charge ratepayers a portion of the costs. The "beneficiary pays" principle, an analogue of the cost causation standard, justifies short-term bill increases when they are offset by longer term benefits that reduce ratepayers' bills. Just as consumers should pay costs that reflect a utility's cost to serve them, a utility may charge consumers for projects that ultimately lower their rates.

PUCs have applied the beneficiary pays approach in numerous contexts. For example, many states fund energy efficiency programs through utility rates. These programs directly benefit the ratepayers that make use of the program's discounts for energy audits, new appliances,

and other interventions that can reduce power use. All ratepayers are billed for these subsidies that flow directly to a handful of individual consumers that take advantage of these benefits. PUCs approve of this spending when programs ultimately lower peak system demand or otherwise reduce power system costs more than the costs of funding the efficiency program. We acknowledge, however, that these calculations are premised on assumptions and judgments and can be as imprecise as the cost allocation exercises we critique in this paper. The best regulators can do is conduct these analyses transparently, which allows for judicial review, limits the potential for arbitrary regulatory decisions, and provides a basis for changing the policy in response to new evidence.

In special contract proceedings, utilities and PUCs offer no such transparency about data center deals. Instead, billion-dollar contracts are proposed and approved without public accounting of the costs and benefits. Given the stakes and the incentives of the parties, the burden ought to be on utilities to prove publicly that ratepayers are benefiting from these deals, or at worst are being held harmless.

Ratepayers should not be saddled with costs due to data centers' purported strategic national importance. In January 2025, the Biden administration declared that AI is "a defining technology of our era" that has a "growing relevance to national security."¹²¹ "Building AI infrastructure in the United States on the time frame needed to ensure United States leadership over competitors," according to the Biden administration, will "prevent adversaries from gaining access to, and using, powerful future systems to the detriment of our military and national security."¹²² If this frightening scenario proves true — that AI will be a privately owned global weapon — it's not clear what it has to do with utility rates.

Data center proponents also tout the economic benefits of new development, but the public is already paying for local job growth through their taxes. Apart from discounted utility rates, many data centers separately receive generous state and local subsidies that governments rationalize based on the supposed economic and employment benefits of permitting new development. Several states, for instance, offer sales tax exemptions that allow data center companies to purchase computers, cooling equipment, and other components without paying state tax. In Virginia, the exemption saved data center companies nearly a billion dollars in 2023 alone.¹²³ Data centers may also benefit from one-off incentive packages. Mississippi is providing an Amazon data center with nearly \$300 million of workforce training and infrastructure upgrades.¹²⁴ Mississippi will also reimburse Amazon for 3.15 percent of the data center construction costs and provide tax exemptions that could be worth more than \$500 million. In lieu of taxes, Amazon will pay approximately \$200 million in fees to the county over five years.¹²⁵

B. Data Center Subsidies Interfere with Needed Power Sector Reforms

The power sector needs major upgrades. Investment in new high-voltage transmission is historically low,¹²⁶ despite an acute need for new power lines that can connect consumers to cheaper and cleaner sources of energy and improve network reliability.¹²⁷ With low interconnectivity, the utility industry is siloed into regional alliances that make little engineering or economic sense. Meanwhile, utilities have been sluggishly slow to adopt monitoring, communications, and computing technologies that can improve the performance of existing high-voltage networks.¹²⁸ At the local level, utilities are failing to unlock the potential of distributed energy resources to lower prices.¹²⁹

Data center growth provides utilities with an excuse to ignore these inefficiencies. Utilities don't have to innovate to supply Big Tech's warehouses and are instead offering to meet data center demand with transmission reinforcements and gas-fired power plants, which have been the industry's bread-and-butter for decades. Some utilities are even propping up their oldest and dirtiest power plants to meet data center demand.¹³⁰ Neither data centers nor regulators are challenging utilities to modernize their systems.

Power sector stagnation is the fault of utilities and the regulatory construct that incentivizes inefficient corporate decisions. Rate regulation enables excessive utility spending that crowds out cheaper alternative investments. Because they are monopolists, utilities do not face competition that might expose their inefficiencies. Regulated rates rarely punish utilities for inefficiencies or reward them for improving their operations through low-cost technologies. Ultimately, regulators must try to align utility performance with consumers' interests, but achieving this straightforward objective is dauntingly complex.

Data center growth now overwhelms many PUC agendas. By law, regulators must respond to utility proposals about rate increases, special contracts, infrastructure development, and other issues. Utilities' messaging to regulators and investors is that meeting data centers' growth targets is an urgent priority. The implication is that there's no time to act differently. With utilities' push for growth dominating their dockets, PUCs may find it even harder to reform inefficient utility practices and block unneeded investments. For ratepayers, beneficial projects will remain unfunded, and wasteful utility practices will persist.

As utilities wring profits from the public through special contract approvals, they may be developing a new alliance with Big Tech. Uniting utilities' influence-peddling experience with the deep pockets of Big Tech could further entrench utility control over the power sector. Utilities are already among the largest donors to state elected officials and have a century of experience navigating state legislatures and agencies to protect their monopoly control and

otherwise advance their interests. A long-term partnership to push the common interests of utilities and data centers at statehouses, PUCs, and other forums could undermine reform efforts and harm ratepayers.

While energy-intensive consumers typically have a financial incentive to participate in PUC proceedings and argue for their own self-interest by opposing wasteful utility spending, we are concerned that a different scenario may play out for data centers. If utilities' growth predictions are realized, some utilities will have invested billions of dollars to serve data centers that will consume *a majority of all power* delivered by the utility. Under this scenario, the utility will be dependent on its data center customers for revenue and will need to retain them in order to justify its prior and future expansion. To prevent data center departures and attract new data center customers, utilities might continue to offer discounted rates. Rather than acting as watchdogs in PUC proceedings, data center companies may instead focus on securing more discounts. Insulated by special contract deals and favorable tariffs with friendly utilities, data center companies would focus on defending their discounts rather than disciplining the utility's spending in rate cases.

Outside of formal proceedings, utility-Big Tech alliances could amplify pro-utility political messages. Utilities have a pecuniary interest in the laws that govern PUC decisionmaking and push for changes that benefit their bottom lines. Utilities formally lobby state legislators and also pursue an array of public relations strategies to secure favorable legislative and regulatory outcomes. Big Tech has the financial capacity to significantly increase the amount of money supporting of pro-utility bills and regulatory actions.

An alternative approach — which requires data centers to power themselves outside of the utility system — sets up a formidable counterweight to utilities' monopoly power. If Big Tech is forced to power itself, it might defend against utility efforts to limit competition and return to the pro-market advocacy that characterized the Big Tech's power-sector lobbying efforts prior to the ChatGPT-inspired AI boom.

Appendix A
Big Tech Companies and Data Center Developers Testifying that
Utility Prices Inform Where They Build New Facilities

- AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications, *supra* note 2, Motion to Intervene and Memorandum in Support of Sidecat, an Affiliate of Meta (Jun. 10, 2024) (“The applicable electricity rates and corresponding electric service tariffs for AEP Ohio will be a significant consideration for Meta when evaluating possible sites for new facilities, expansions at existing facilities, and otherwise operating its data center assets.”).
- AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications, Direct Testimony of Brendon J. Baatz in Opposition of the Second Joint Stipulation and Recommendation, at 4 (Nov. 8, 2024) (“the terms and conditions in Schedule DCT are far more restrictive and burdensome than those imposed by investor-owned utilities in other states, which could prompt some data center customers to consider investing outside of Ohio”).
- AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications, Second Supplemental Direct Testimony of Michael Fradette, on Behalf of Amazon Data Services, Inc., at 18 (Nov. 8, 2024) (“By rejecting a stipulation that unfairly discriminates against data centers, the Commission can help ensure that Ohio continues to be a leader in attracting investment from this vital industry.”).
- AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications, Motion to Intervene of Data Center Coalition, at 4 (May 24, 2024) (“AEP Ohio’s proposals, and potential proposals made by intervenors in the case, may have a significant impact on existing and planned data centers in AEP Ohio’s service territory.”).
- AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications, Direct Testimony of Brendon J. Baatz, at 11 (Oct. 18, 2024) (“If AEP Ohio’s proposal is adopted, it would create an unfavorable environment for data center development in the state, potentially causing companies to reconsider their investment plans.”).
- AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications, Direct Testimony of Kevin C. Higgins on behalf of The Data Center Coalition, at 7 (Oct. 18, 2024) (“If approved, the DCP tariff will adversely impact planned data center development in the Company’s service territory.”); *id.* at 11 (“At the same time, it is important that the Commission not take actions that would depress the growth of an important emerging industry by imposing unjust and discriminatory terms.”).
- Indiana Michigan Power Proposed Tariff Modification, *supra* note 15, Direct Testimony of Kevin C. Higgins on behalf of The Data Center Coalition, at 6 (Oct. 15, 2024) (“If

approved, the IP Tariff changes could adversely impact planned data center development in the Company's service territory.”).

- Indiana Michigan Power Proposed Tariff Modification, Direct Testimony of Justin B. Farr on behalf of Google, at 23 (Oct. 15, 2024) (“Modifications . . . have the potential to limit opportunities for . . . the development of shared solutions that can provide significant benefit to I&M’s system by removing the financial incentive for I&M to collaborate with its customers to pursue innovative solutions to support their growth.”).
- Indiana Michigan Power Proposed Tariff Modification, Direct Testimony of Michael Fradette on behalf of Amazon Data Services, Inc., at 37 (Oct. 15, 2024) (“The proposed [tariff] is not reasonable and in fact has a negative impact on Amazon’s view for future investment actions within I&M’s service territory. I&M has offered no reasonable justification for revising Tariff I.P. as proposed.”).
- Contracts for Provision of Electric Service to a New Large Customer’s Minnesota Data Center Project, Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n Docket No. 22-572, Petition, at 28 (“The customer has made clear that the CRR Rate is critically important to its decision to select a site in Minnesota for its new data center. Without the CRR Rate, the economic feasibility of this new data center would be jeopardized.”).
- In re Application of Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado for Approval of a Non-Standard EDR Contract, Pub. Util. Comm’n of Colorado Proceeding No. 23A-0330E, Direct Testimony & Attachment of Travis Wright on behalf of Quality Technology Services, at 8 (Jun. 23, 2023) (“QTS selects its new locations extremely carefully. Electricity is one of the major costs to operating a data center, so the low EDR rate provided by Public Service, and the term of the EDR agreement, is a critical factor in determining to locate in Aurora.”); *id.* at 10–11 (“Given that approximately 40 percent of the Aurora QTS Campus’s operational expense will be attributable to utilities, with electric being the largest component, the cost per kWh can easily make or break a project, or drive QTS or its customers to invest resources elsewhere. The EDR ESA that we have negotiated with Public Service and are requesting approval of in this Proceeding, is a critical component of our business model for the Aurora QTS Campus.”); *id.* at 16 (“Was the cost of electricity a critical consideration for QTS in deciding where to site its new operations? Yes. 40 percent of the operational cost of a data center is electricity, and this will usually be the largest line item on the budget. Additionally, this cost will continue for 40 years, and will scale the business. In contrast, real estate and development costs are one-time, up-front expenditures that are watered down as the

volume of business increases. The largest and fastest growing operations in our portfolio are in markets where electricity costs are competitive.”).

- In re Application of Ohio Power Company and New Albany Data Center, LLC for Approval of a Reasonable Arrangement, Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio Case No. 23-0891-EL-AEC, Joint Application, at 7 (Sep. 28, 2023) (“Without this reasonable arrangement, NADC could construct its own dedicated substation and take lower-cost service under AEP Ohio’s transmission voltage tariff – to the extent it would decide to develop its facilities in AEP Ohio’s service territory.”).
- Application of Nevada Power Company for Approval of an Energy Supply Agreement with Lumen Group, Pub. Util. Comm’n of Nev. Docket No. 19-12017, Application, Attachment A: Long Term Energy Supply Agreement White Paper, at 17 (Dec. 19, 2019) (“The ESA provides Google with important benefits . . . the blended rate provided for in the ESA is cost-effective and competitively priced compared to other available options, the fixed-price nature of the agreement provides Google with important cost-certainty into its energy expenditures . . .”).

Endnotes

* Eliza Martin is a Legal Fellow in the Environmental and Energy Law Program at Harvard Law School. Ari Peskoe is the Director of the Electricity Law Initiative. We thank Kent Chandler, Josh Macey, Abe Silverman, and Megan Wachspress for thoughtful feedback on our draft.

¹ See, e.g., JOHN D. WILSON, ZACH ZIMMERMAN & ROB GRAMLICH, STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES SURGING: DRIVING US POWER DEMAND 8 (Grid Strategies, Dec. 2024) [hereinafter Grid Strategies Report]; Alastair Green et al., [How Data Centers and the Energy Sector Can Sate AI's Hunger for Power](#), MCKINSEY & Co., (“Much of data center growth — about 70 percent — is expected to be fulfilled directed or indirectly (via cloud services, for instance) by hyperscalers by 2030”); EPRI, POWERING INTELLIGENCE: ANALYZING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & DATA CENTER ENERGY CONSUMPTION 7 (May 2024) [hereinafter Powering Intelligence]; Jennifer Hiller & Katherine Blunt, [Inside the Audacious Plan to Reopen Three Mile Island's Nuclear Plant](#), WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10, 2024), (“Analysts at Jefferies estimate Microsoft will pay between \$110 and \$115 per megawatt hour of electricity”).

² See, e.g., In re *Application of Ohio Power Company for New Tariffs Related to Data Centers*, Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio Case No. 24-508-EL-ATA [hereinafter AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications], Direct Testimony of Kevin C. Higgins on behalf of The Data Center Coalition, at 7 (“If approved, the [proposed] tariff will adversely impact planned data center development in the Company’s service territory.”); *id.* at 11 (“At the same time, it is important that the Commission not take actions that would depress the growth of an important emerging industry by imposing unjust and discriminatory terms.”). See Appendix A for additional evidence.

³ See, e.g., Rich Miller, [Skybox Plans 300-Megawatt Campus South of Dallas](#), DATA CENTER FRONTIER (Nov. 20, 2023); City of Cleveland, [Office of Sustainability & Climate Justice](#) (noting that the city has a 300-megawatt system).

⁴ Palo Verde is the largest nuclear power station in the U.S. Its three reactors produce approximately 3.3 gigawatts. Meta announced a two-gigawatt data center development in December 2024. See Dan Swinhoe & Zachary Skidmore, [Meta Announces 4 Million Square Foot, 2 GW Louisiana Data Center Campus](#), DATA CENTER DYNAMICS (Sep. 5, 2024).

⁵ See generally Powering Intelligence; Alastair Green et al., [How Data Centers and the Energy Sector Can Sate AI's Hunger for Power](#), MCKINSEY & Co.

⁶ See, e.g., Grid Strategies Report (“[A]nnual peak demand growth will average 3% per year over the next five years. While 3% growth may seem small to some, it would mean six times the planning and construction of new generation and transmission capacity.”).

⁷ See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, SUMMER ENERGY MARKET & ELECTRIC RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 46 (May 23, 2024) (showing 19 GW actual demand in 2023); Newmark, 2023 U.S. DATA CENTER MARKET OVERVIEW & MARKET CLUSTERS 7 (Jan. 2024) (projecting 35 GW in 2030); [AI is Poised to Drive 160% Increase in Data Center Power Demand](#), Goldman Sachs (May 14, 2024).

⁸ See Grid Strategies Report, at 12.

⁹ See Georgia Power Company, Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n Docket No. 56002, [Budget 2025: Load and Energy Forecast 2025 to 2044](#) (Jan. 31, 2025); Drew Kann and Zachary Hansen, *Data Centers Use Lots of Energy: Georgia Lawmakers Might Make Them Pay More*, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL CONSTITUTION (Feb. 13, 2025) (stating that Georgia Power executives stated that 80 percent of the company’s forecasted electricity demand growth is due to data centers).

¹⁰ Press Release, [Oncor Electric Delivery Company, Oncor Reports Third Quarter 2024 Results](#) (Nov. 6, 2024),.

¹¹ Robert Walton, [ERCOT Successfully Navigates Heat Wave, New Peak Demand Record](#), UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 26, 2024).

¹² See Ethan Howland, [AEP Faces 15 GW of New Load, Driven by Amazon, Google, Other Data Centers: Interim CEO Fowke](#), UTILITY DIVE (May 1, 2024); American Electric Power, [4th Quarter Earnings Presentation](#) (Feb. 13, 2025).

¹³ See, e.g., In re *Application of Ohio Power Company for New Tariffs Related to Data Centers*, Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio Case No. 24-508-EL-ATA [hereinafter AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications], Direct Testimony of Matthew S. McKenzie on Behalf of Ohio Power Company [hereinafter Ohio Power Company Testimony], at 2 (May 13, 2024).

¹⁴ Indeed, investors are taking note. The authors have on file numerous reports from utility stock analysts that tout the potential of data center growth. Utilities’ presentations to investors claim that data center growth will drive future earnings. See, e.g., AEP 4th Quarter Earnings Presentation, *supra* note 13, at 13 (stating that “Load Growth Supports Financial Strength” and noting it is being driven by data centers).

¹⁵ See, e.g., *In re Verified Petition of Indiana Michigan Power Company for Approval of Modifications to its Industrial Tariff*, Indiana Util. Reg. Comm’n Cause No. 46097 [hereinafter *Indiana Michigan Power Proposed Tariff Modifications*], Testimony of Indiana Consumer Advocates, at 4 (Oct. 15, 2024) (“There has been a significant lack of transparency with these new loads . . . For example, with respect to new large loads coming to I&M’s service territory, Google and Microsoft refused to answer CAC data requests about their anticipated load and electricity consumption, and Microsoft also refused to identify its forecasted load factor. CAC counsel reached out to counsel to these parties and requested to execute a non-disclosure agreement with each respective company so that CAC could obtain this pertinent information, but thus far, we have not received a proposed non-disclosure agreement or the confidential information.”). Most of the figures in the Georgia Power filing cited at note 9 are redacted.

¹⁶ See, e.g., AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications, Ohio Power Company Testimony, *supra* note 13, at 2 (“Currently, AEP Ohio has limited ability to distinguish customers who are merely speculating on potential data center investments from customers who are willing to make long-term financial commitments to data center investments.”) (original emphasis); *Large Loads Co-Located at General Facilities Technical Conference*, FERC Docket No. AD24-11-000, Transcript, at 26 (Aubrey Johnson, Vice-President, Systems & Resource Planning for the Midcontinent Independent System Operator explaining that “in many cases, these data centers are showing up in multiple places, so I have many members submitting loads that are all the same. So how do we have more clarity . . . to understand what the actual true load is?”).

¹⁷ See *generally* Powering Intelligence, at 7.

¹⁸ See, e.g., David Uberti, [AI Rout Sends Independent Power Stocks Stumbling](#), WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2025), (“DeepSeek’s efficient approach have ‘created panic among investors who question the sustainability of US data center and AI investments,’ Guggenheim analysts wrote in a note”); JONATHAN KOOMEY, TANYA DAS & ZACHARY SCHMIDT, *ELECTRICITY DEMAND GROWTH AND DATA CENTERS: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED* (Bipartisan Policy Center & Koomey Analytics, Feb. 2025).

¹⁹ The Grainger College of Engineering, [Why DeepSeek Could be Good News for Energy Consumption](#), (Feb. 6, 2025); James O’Donnell, [DeepSeek Might Not be Such Good News for Energy After All](#), MIT TECH. REVIEW (Jan. 31, 2025).

²⁰ See Deepa Seetharaman and Tom Dotan, [Tech Leaders Pledge Up to \\$500 Billion in AI Investment in the U.S.](#), WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2025).

²¹ Jordan Novet, [Microsoft Expects to Spend \\$80 Billion on AI-Enabled Data Centers in Fiscal 2025](#), CNBC (Jan. 3, 2025).

²² Press Release, State of Ohio, [Governor DeWine Announces \\$10 Billion Investment Plan from Amazon Web Services in Greater Ohio](#) (Dec. 16, 2024).

²³ Dan Swinhoe & Zachary Skidmore, [Meta Announces 4 Million Sq Ft, 2 GW Louisiana Data Center](#), DATA CENTER DYNAMICS (Dec. 5, 2024).

²⁴ See *generally* Aneil Kovvali & Joshua C. Macey, *Hidden Value Transfers in Public Utilities*, 171 PENN. L. REV. 2129 (2023).

²⁵ KEN COSTELLO, *ALTERNATIVE RATE MECHANISMS & THEIR COMPATIBILITY WITH STATE UTILITY COMMISSION OBJECTIVES*, NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 2 (Apr. 2014).

²⁶ See U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Electric Power Monthly*, [Table 5.6.A. Average Price of Electricity to Ultimate Customers by End-Use Sector](#) (showing average residential, commercial, and industrial rates in each state).

²⁷ *Alabama Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. FERC*, 684 F.2d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

²⁸ *Co. Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n*, 324 U.S. 581, 590 (1945).

²⁹ JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, *PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES* 338 (1961).

³⁰ See, e.g., *Off. of Consumer Counsel v. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control et al.*, 905 A.2d 1, 6 (Conn. 2006) (“In the specialized context of a rate case, the court may not substitute its own balance of the regulatory considerations for that of the agency, and must assure itself that the [department] has given consideration of the factors expressed in [the statute].”); *Iowa-Ill. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ill. Com. Comm’n*, 19 Ill. 2d 436, 442 (Ill. 1960) (explaining that deference to the Commission is “especially appropriate in the area of fixing rates”); *Farmland Ind., Inc. v. Kan. Corp. Comm’n*, 37 P.3d 640, 650 (Kan. App. 2001) (providing that the Kansans Corporation Commission “has broad discretion in making decisions in rate design types of issues”); *Ohio Consumers’ Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm’n*, 926 N.E.2d 261, 266 (Ohio 2010) (“The lack of a governing statute telling the commission how it must design rates vests the commission with broad discretion in this area.”).

³¹ See *2024 FERC Rep. on Enforcement*, FERC Docket No. AD07-13-018, at 51 (Nov. 21, 2024) (“Most audits find that public utilities recorded non-operating expenses and functional operating and maintenance expenses

in [Administrative and General] expense accounts, leading to inappropriate inclusion of such costs in revenue requirements produced by their formula rates”); see also *infra* note 34.

³² *FirstEnergy Corp.*, FERC Docket No. FA19-1-000, Audit Report, at 48 (Feb. 4, 2022).

³³ *Id.* at 16.

³⁴ See, e.g., *Application of Southern California Gas Company for Authority to Update its Gas Revenue Requirement and Bas Rates*, California Pub. Util. Comm’n Application 22-05-015, Decision 24-12-074, at 7 (Dec. 19, 2024) (“The decision [to use one-way balancing accounts] highlights a pattern of misclassification of costs at Sempra Utilities, where the company has charged ratepayers for lobbying, political activities, and expenses related to outside legal firms. These costs have been improperly booked as above-the-line expenses when forecasting future costs.”); *Order Instituting Rulemaking*, California Pub. Util. Comm’n Rulemaking 13-11-005, Decision 22-04-034 (Apr. 7, 2022) (“As an experienced utility, SoCalGas should have known that its billing of lobbying against reach codes implicates several basic legal principles that are central to its duties to the Commission and to customers . . . Thus, aside from billing ratepayers for lobbying contrary to the intent of the Commission, SoCalGas appears on the face of the record to have misled staff about the direction of its lobbying....”). See also 2024 FERC Rep. on Enforcement, FERC Docket No. AD07-13-018, at 58 (Nov. 21, 2024) (summarizing that FERC audits revealed “improper application of merger-related costs; lobbying, charitable donation, membership dues, and employment discrimination settlement costs; improper labor overhead capitalization rates....”).

³⁵ Costello, *supra* note 25, at 44. See also *Investigation into the Reasonableness of Rates & Charges of PacifiCorp*, Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n Docket No. 99-035-10, 2000 WL 873337 (2000) (“[E]ach class of service does not pay precisely its ‘share’ of costs. This is true, for example, of the large customer groups, or special contract customers, according to some views of allocations.”).

³⁶ See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 216B.162, subd.7 (2024); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-104.3 (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.6a(3).

³⁷ KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101i.

³⁸ See MISS. CODE ANN. § 77-3-271(3) (“A public utility may enter into a large customer supply and service agreement with a customer, which may include terms and pricing for electric service without reference to the rates or other conditions that may be established or fixed under Title 77, Chapter 3, Article 1, Mississippi Code of 1972. No approval by the commission of such agreement shall be required. With respect to such an agreement...the agreement, including any pricing or charges for electric service, shall not be subject to alteration or other modification or cancelation by the commission, for the entire term of the agreement....”).

³⁹ See Appendix A.

⁴⁰ See, e.g., *Application of El Paso Electric Company for an Economic Development Rate Rider for a New Data Center*, Pub. Util. Comm’n Texas Docket No. 56903, Order No. 1 (Aug. 2, 2024) (issuing standard protective order with no analysis); *Petition of Duke Energy Indiana for Approval of a Special Retail Electric Service Agreement*, Indiana Util. Reg. Comm’n Cause No. 45975, Order (Nov. 20, 2023) (granting Duke Energy’s motion for confidential treatment); *In re Cheyenne Light, Fuel & Power Co. Petition for Confidential Treatment of a Contract with Mineone Wyoming Data Center LLC*, Wyoming Pub. Serv. Comm’n Docket No. 20003-238-EK-24 (Record No. 17600), Letter Order (Oct. 9, 2024) (authorizing confidential treatment); *In re Xcel Energy’s Petition for Approval of Contracts for Provision of Service to a New Large Customer’s Minnesota Data Center Project*, Minn. Pub. Util. Comm’n Docket No. E-002/M-22-572, Order (excising significant portions of the proposed service agreement and staff analysis because it is a “highly confidential trade secret”); *Tariff Filing of Kentucky Power Company for Approval of a Special Contract with Ebon International, LLC*, Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm’n Case No. 2022-00387, Order (Dec. 4, 2024), at 3 (granting confidential treatment for utility filing and providing that the information “shall not be placed in the public record or made available for public inspection for five years or until further order[ed]”).

⁴¹ See *id.*; see also Daniel Dassow, [University of Tennessee Professor Sues TVA for Records of Incentives to Bitcoin Miners](#), KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL (Oct. 29, 2024) (explaining how there was no information about the incentives that TVA gave a cryptocurrency company to build within its footprint, but that the company used 9.4 percent of all Knoxville Utilities Board electricity in 2023 while employing just thirty people).

⁴² See Costello, *supra* note 25, at 21.

⁴³ See Peter Lazare, *Special Contracts and the Ratemaking Process*, 10 ELEC. J. 67, 68–70 (1997) (quoting a Commonwealth Edison filing that argues long-run costs are appropriate for rate cases and short-term costs are appropriate for special contract proceedings and explaining the implications of using different metrics).

⁴⁴ See, e.g., *In re Application of Ohio Power Company and New Albany Data Center, LLC for Approval of a Reasonable Arrangement*, Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio Case No. 23-0891-EL-AEC, Order Approving the Application with Modification (“The proposed arrangement meets the burden of proof for obtaining a

reasonable arrangement under Ohio Adm. Code Chapter 4901:1-38. Furthermore, we find that the proposed arrangement, as modified by Staff, is reasonable and should be approved.”). Occasionally, a state PUC applying its public interest standard will gesture at a utility’s static marginal cost analysis or no-harm analysis for analytical support. See, e.g., *Petition of Duke Energy Indiana for Approval of a Special Retail Electric Service Agreement*, Indiana Util. Reg. Comm’n Cause No. 45975, Order of the Commission (Apr. 24, 2024) (“In making such a determination [that the proposed agreement satisfies Indiana Code], two considerations are important: whether the rates negotiated between the utility and its customer are sufficient for the utility to cover the incremental cost of providing the service to the customer and still make some contribution to the utility’s recovery of its fixed costs, and whether the utility has sufficient capacity to meet the customer’s needs. As explained by [Duke Energy’s Vice President of Rates and Regulatory Strategy], the Agreement requires that Customer cover the incremental costs of providing service to it, as well as contributing to Petitioner’s recovery of fixed costs...Based on the evidence of record, we find and conclude that the terms and conditions contemplated in the Agreement are just and reasonable...Therefore, we find that the Agreement is in the public interest and is, therefore, approved....”); *In re Idaho Power Company’s Application for Approval of a Special Contract and Tariff Schedule 33 to Provide Electric Service to Brisbie, LLC’s Data Center Facility*, Idaho Pub. Util. Comm’n Case No. IPC-E-21-42, Order No. 35958 (“Commission Discussion and Findings: The Commission has jurisdiction over this matter under *Idaho Code* §§ 61-501, -502, and -503...We have reviewed the record in this case and find the Company’s August 30, 2023, Filing including an amended ESA, revised Schedule 33, and additional modifications is consistent with the Commission’s directive in Order No. 3577.”).

⁴⁵ See *Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. NTE Carolinas II, LLC*, 111 F.4th 337, 344–46 (4th Cir. 2024).

⁴⁶ *Id.* at 347.

⁴⁷ *Id.* at 349.

⁴⁸ See Appendix A.

⁴⁹ See generally Kovvali & Macey, *supra* note 24.

⁵⁰ Cross-Subsidization Restrictions on Affiliate Transactions, 73 Fed. Reg. 11,013 (2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).

⁵¹ See, e.g., *Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. FERC*, 476 U.S. 953 (1986).

⁵² See, e.g., *Nat’l Ass’n of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. FERC*, 475 F.3d 1227, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2007); *Entergy Services, Inc. v. FERC*, 319 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 2003); *South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC*, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

⁵³ PJM, [PJM Board of Managers Approves Critical Grid Upgrades](#), PJM INSIDE LINES (Dec. 11, 2023).

⁵⁴ Sami Abdulsalam, Senior Manager, PJM Transmission Planning, [Reliability Analysis Update at Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee Meeting](#) (Dec. 5, 2023). See also *PJM Revisions to Incorporate Cost Responsibility Assignments for Regional Transmission Expansion Plan Baseline Upgrades*, FERC Docket No. ER24-843, Protest and Comments of Maryland Office of People’s Counsel (Feb. 9, 2024) [hereinafter Maryland People’s Counsel Protest].

⁵⁵ See generally *PJM Interconnection*, 187 FERC ¶ 61,012 at P 6 (2024); Maryland People’s Counsel Protest, Affidavit of Ron Nelson, at 5.

⁵⁶ See Maryland People’s Counsel Protest, Affidavit of Ron Nelson, at 5.

⁵⁷ See *Delmarva Power & Light Co. Modification of Retail Transmission Rates*, Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm’n Case No. 8890, Revised Tariff, Attachment E (Jul. 2, 2024) (allocating 68 percent of transmission costs to residential customers); *Potomac Electric Power Co. Modification of Retail Transmission Rates*, Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm’n Case No. 8890, Revised Tariff, Attachment F (Jul. 2, 2024) (allocating 53 percent of transmission costs to residential customers); *Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. Updated Market-Priced Service Rates, Administrative Charges, and Retail Transmission Rates under Rider 1*, Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm’n Case Nos. 9056/9064, Attachment 2: Development of the Retail Transmission Rates (Apr. 30, 2024) (allocating 78 percent of transmission costs to residential customers).

⁵⁸ *Application of Virginia Electric and Power Co.*, Virginia Corp. Comm’n. Case No. PUR-2021-00102, Report of Chief Hearing Examiner Alexander F. Skirpan, Jr., at 9–10 (Jul. 14, 2021).

⁵⁹ The cost causation principle could require a shift from transmission rates based on average — or static marginal — costs, to dynamic marginal cost analyses. See *In re Application of Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado for Approval of a Non-Standard EDR Contract*, Colorado Pub. Util. Comm’n Proceeding No. 23A-0330E, Commission Decision Denying Exceptions to Decision No. R24-0168 and Adopting Recommended Decision with Modifications, at 11–12 (May 15, 2024) (“[W]e emphasize that the Commission’s review of future Non-Standard EDR contracts must entail detailed examination of how the addition of large loads to the Public Service’s system may create a dynamic need for multi-billion new generation and transmission capacity investments that unpredictably show up with no meaningful notice to this Commission and may not be easily

captured in a static marginal cost analysis . . . To that end, the marginal cost analysis that Public Service applied to the EDR ESA with [the data center customer] may not be adequate in future proceedings where the Commission reviews a similar Non-Standard EDR contract especially in light of the rapidly evolving and dynamic interaction between rising demand and the potential costs of serving that growth.”).

⁶⁰ *Application of Virginia Electric Power*, Virginia Corp. Comm’n. Case No. PUR-2024-00135, Report of Hearing Examiner Bryan D. Stogdale, at 47 (Feb. 14, 2025).

⁶¹ *Application of Virginia Electric Power*, Virginia Corp. Comm’n. Case No. PUR-2024-00135, Report of Hearing Examiner Bryan D. Stogdale, at 23 (Feb. 14, 2025).

⁶² *Supra* note 58.

⁶³ See AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications, Ohio Power Company Testimony, at 18–20 (May 13, 2024).

⁶⁴ See AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications, Prepared Direct Testimony of Dennis W. Bethel on Behalf of Buckeye Power, Inc. and American Municipal Power [hereinafter Buckeye Power Comments], at 18–19 (Aug. 29, 2024).

⁶⁵ *Dayton Power & Light Co.*, 189 FERC ¶ 61,220 (2024).

⁶⁶ *Dayton Power & Light Co.*, FERC Docket No. ER25-192, Protest of the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel [hereinafter Protest of the Office of Ohio Consumers’ Counsel], at 4 (Nov. 13, 2024); *Dayton Power & Light Co.*, FERC Docket No. ER25-192, Limited Comments of Buckeye Power (Nov. 21, 2024).

⁶⁷ Protest of the Office of the Ohio Consumers’ Counsel at 5.

⁶⁸ *Dayton Power and Light Co.*, 189 FERC ¶ 61,220 at P 23 (2024).

⁶⁹ *PJM Interconnection and Virginia Electric and Power Company*, 169 FERC ¶ 61,041 (2019).

⁷⁰ See, e.g., Walker Orenstein, [Amazon Wants to Limit Review of 250 Diesel Generators at Its Minnesota Data Center](#), MINNESOTA STAR TRIBUNE (Feb. 17, 2025) (noting that Amazon wants to install 600 megawatts of on-site diesel-powered generators at its new data center).

⁷¹ *Constellation Energy Generation v. PJM*, FERC Docket No. EL25-20, Complaint Requesting Fast Track Processing of Constellation Energy Generation, LLC [hereinafter Constellation Complaint], at 20–21 (Nov. 22, 2024).

⁷² *Constellation Energy Generation v. PJM*, Docket No. EL25-20, Exelon Comments in Opposition to the Complaint, at 3 (Dec. 12, 2024) (“Constellation refers to Co-Located Load as being ‘Fully Isolated’ and repeats that term again and again, but it remains untrue. If the loads at issue were truly ‘isolated,’ the PJM Tariff would not apply to them; no FERC-jurisdictional tariff would. And there would be no reason for this proceeding. As further discussed . . . the loads — whether they are what Constellation labels ‘fully isolated’ or not — unavoidably rely upon and use grid facilities and grid services in multiple ways. As a matter of physics and engineering, the load is fully integrated with the electric grid — this is the opposite of ‘Fully Isolated.’”).

⁷³ See, e.g., *Constellation Energy Generation v. PJM*, FERC Docket No. EL25-20, Comments of the Illinois Attorney General, at 12–13 (Dec. 12, 2024); *Large Loads Co-Located at General Facilities*, FERC Docket No. AD24-11-000, Post Technical Comments of the Organization of PJM States, Inc., at 4 (Dec. 9, 2024) (stating that “[t]ransmission customers have paid the costs of supporting the grid necessary to allow [] nuclear facilities to operate”).

⁷⁴ *PJM Interconnection, LLC*, FERC Docket No. ER24-2172 [hereinafter Susquehanna Nuclear Interconnection Agreement], Protest of Exelon Corporation & American Electric Power Service Corporation, Declaration of John J. Reed & Danielle S. Powers, at 4 (Jun. 24, 2024).

⁷⁵ *Susquehanna Nuclear Interconnection Agreement*, Motion for Leave to Answer and Answer of Constellation Energy Generation and Vistra Corp., at 11 (Jul. 10, 2024).

⁷⁶ See PJM, [2025/2026 Base Residual Auction Report](#), at 11 (2024).

⁷⁷ See [2024 Quarterly State of the Market Report for PJM: January Through September](#), MONITORING ANALYTICS 3 (2024). See also Buckeye Power Comments, at 15 (Aug. 29, 2024) (“Co-location of data centers at existing multi-unit generators (nuclear plants are considered ideal) appears, at first blush, to be attractive as it can ‘free-up’ transmission capacity by reducing the net output of the generators that the transmission system must deliver. But co-location is a complicated scenario that can disrupt power markets and shift costs by removing large blocks of reliable base load power that will need to be replaced by other sources that will likely require transmission expansion elsewhere.”); *Constellation Energy Generation v. PJM*, FERC Docket No. EL25-20, Comments of the Illinois Attorney General, at 3–4 (Dec. 12, 2024) (“The OAG’s primary concern regarding co-location arrangements is the impact on resource adequacy and electricity energy and capacity prices The effect of removing the Illinois nuclear power plant capacity from the ComEd zone and from the PJM market generally can be expected to drive up prices In light of these multiple factors that are currently putting pressure on prices, co-location arrangements that reserve large blocks of power for discrete customers and prevent them from serving the grid as a whole can be expected to affect the 2027/2028 [capacity prices] . . .

. The OAG is concerned that co-location arrangements that abruptly remove large resources with high capacity values from the grid will cause further devastating price increases while the PJM markets struggle to respond.”).

⁷⁸ See *infra* Section III.C.

⁷⁹ See *Constellation Energy Generation v. PJM*, FERC Docket No. EL25-20, Constellation Complaint, at 6–7 (Nov. 22, 2024) (“competition to serve data center loads [is] a threat to [utilities] bottom line”).

⁸⁰ *Id.* (“Exelon’s utilities already have taken the position that this Commission has decreed that Fully Isolated Co-Located Load is ‘impossible’ — and shut down any attempt by customers to co-locate data center load in their utility systems. As detailed in their petition for declaratory order filed in Docket No. EL24-149, Exelon is refusing to process necessary studies on these grounds, demanding expensive upgrades under their unified interconnection procedures, delaying agreed-upon work which will force a nuclear plant to take additional outages, and forcing additional services to be procured.”).

⁸¹ See *PJM Interconnection, LLC*, 190 FERC ¶ 61,115 (Feb. 20, 2025) (instituting a show cause proceeding pursuant to section 206 of the FPA, and directing PJM and the Transmission Owners to either (1) show cause as to why the Tariff “remains just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential without provisions addressing the sufficient clarity or consistency the rates, terms, and conditions of service that apply to co-location arrangements; or (2) explain what changes to the Tariff would remedy the identified concerns if the Commission were to determine that the Tariff has in fact become unjust and unreasonable or unduly discriminatory or preferential, and therefore, proceeds to establish a replacement Tariff”).

⁸² See *In the Matter of: Electronic Tariff Filing of Kentucky Power Company for Approval of a Special Contract with Ebon International, LLC*, Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm’n Case No. 2022-00387, at 2–4 (Aug. 28, 2023) (citing *Investigation into the Implementation of Economic Development Rates by Electric & Gas Utilities*, Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm’n Admin. Case No. 327 (Sep. 24, 1990), *aff’d*, *Kentucky Power Co. v. PSC of Kentucky*, Franklin Circuit Court, Div. 1, Civil Action No. 23-CI-00899 (Dec. 30, 2024)).

⁸³ *Id.*

⁸⁴ See AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications, Ohio Power Company Testimony, at 2 (May 13, 2024). AEP Ohio requested PUC approval to create two new customer classifications: data centers with a monthly maximum demand of 25 MW or greater, and mobile data centers (cryptocurrency miners) with a monthly maximum demand of 1 MW or greater. AEP’s proposed tariff would include new obligations for these customer classes, including a minimum demand charge of 90 percent for data centers, and 95 percent for cryptocurrency facilities, as opposed to the standard 60 percent minimum demand charge for other customers in the general service rate class. AEP Ohio would also require: the two customer classes enter into energy service agreements (ESAs) for an initial term of at least ten years, as opposed to the typical term of one to five years; requirements to pay an exit fee equal to three years of minimum charges should the customer cancel the ESA after five years; collateral requirements tied to the customer’s credit ratings; requirements to reduce demand on AEP Ohio’s system during an emergency event; and requirements to participate in a separate energy procurement auction than standard offer service customers

⁸⁵ *Id.* at 7–8.

⁸⁶ AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications, Initial Comments of Data Center Coalition, at 9–12 (Jun. 25, 2024).

⁸⁷ *Basin Electric Power Cooperative*, 188 FERC ¶ 61,132 at PP 15–16, 61 (2024).

⁸⁸ *Id.* at P 95.

⁸⁹ See [H.B. 2101](#), 2025 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2025).

⁹⁰ See Indiana Michigan Power Proposed Tariff Modifications, *supra* note 15, Direct Testimony of Andrew J. Williamson on Behalf of Indiana Michigan Power Company, at 5 (Jul. 19, 2024).

⁹¹ *Id.* at 3, 6–7.

⁹² *Id.* at 14.

⁹³ *Id.*; *id.* at 16 (tariff terms ensure data center provides “reasonable financial support for the significant transmission and generation infrastructure needed to serve large loads”).

⁹⁴ Indiana Michigan Power Proposed Tariff Modifications, *supra* note 15, Direct Testimony of Benjamin Inskeep on Behalf of Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. [hereinafter Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana Testimony], at 25 (Oct. 15, 2024).

⁹⁵ *Id.* at 36.

⁹⁶ *Id.* at 24–31.

⁹⁷ Indiana Michigan Power Proposed Tariff Modifications, *supra* note 15, Direct Testimony of Carolyn A. Berry on Behalf of Amazon Web Services, at 16 (Oct. 15, 2024).

⁹⁸ *Id.*

⁹⁹ *Id.*

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- ¹⁰⁰ See generally *Application of Nevada Power Company to Implement Clean Transition Tariff Schedule*, Nevada Pub. Util. Comm’n Docket No. 24-05023 [Nevada Power Clean Transition Tariff], Direct Testimony of Manuel N. Lopez on Behalf of Regulatory Operations Staff (Jan. 16, 2025); Nevada Power Clean Transition Tariff, Direct Testimony of Jeremy I. Fisher on Behalf of Sierra Club, Docket No. PUCN 24-05023, at 10–20 (Jan. 16, 2025).
- ¹⁰¹ See generally Nevada Power Clean Transition Tariff, Direct Testimony of Manuel N. Lopez on Behalf of Regulatory Operations Staff, at 7–8 (Jan. 16, 2025).
- ¹⁰² Nevada Power Clean Transition Tariff, Stipulation (Feb. 7, 2025).
- ¹⁰³ See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 46-3-8 (allowing utilities to compete to provide service to certain new customers demanding at least 900 kilowatts).
- ¹⁰⁴ See Indiana Michigan Power Proposed Tariff Modifications, *supra* note 15, Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana Testimony, at 11 (Oct. 15, 2024) (“Using I&M witness Williamson’s example portfolio that has an average resource cost of \$2,000/kW and has an average accredited capacity of 50%, I&M will also need to make \$17.6 billion in new generation investments to serve 4.4 GW of new hyperscaler load.”).
- ¹⁰⁵ ERIC GIMON, MARK AHLSTROM & MIKE O’BOYLE, ENERGY PARKS: A NEW STRATEGY TO MEET RISING ELECTRICITY DEMAND 7 (Energy Innovation Policy & Technology, Dec. 2024).
- ¹⁰⁶ *Id.* at 8.
- ¹⁰⁷ See *id.* at 19.
- ¹⁰⁸ See *id.* at 8–21.
- ¹⁰⁹ See, e.g., *State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. North Carolina Waste Awareness and Reduction Network*, 805 S.E.2d 712 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017), *aff’d per curiam*, 371 N.C. 109, 617 (2018).
- ¹¹⁰ See *Sawnee Electric Membership Corporation v. Public Service Comm’n*, 371 Ga. App. 267, 270 (2024) (“ . . . [T]he text of the Act assigns each geographic area to an electric supplier but also includes the large load exception to allow customers to choose their electric supplier if certain conditions exist . . . the premises must be ‘utilized by one consumer and have single-metered service’”).
- ¹¹¹ See generally David Roberts, [Assembling Diverse Resources Into Super-Powered “Energy Parks:” A Conversation with Eric Gimon of Energy Innovation](#), VOLTS (Jan. 15, 2025) (featuring an Energy Innovation author describing energy parks in rural cooperative territory in Texas).
- ¹¹² See, e.g., *Paoli Mun. Light Dept. v. Orange County Rural Elec. Membership Corp.*, 904 N.E.2d 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (ruling in favor of a cooperative utility that sued to prevent a municipal utility from providing electric service to a facility owned by that municipality but located within the cooperative’s service territory).
- ¹¹³ See, e.g., [Power for Tomorrow](#) (last visited Jan. 29, 2025), which claims to be “the nation’s leading resource” about the “regulated electric utility model” and generally opposes competition with utilities, in part by claiming that competition harms residential consumers. The effort is funded by utilities. See Energy and Policy Institute, [Power for Tomorrow](#) (last visited Jan. 29, 2025).
- ¹¹⁴ AEP Ohio Proposed Tariff Modifications, Testimony of Paul Sotkiewicz on Behalf of the Retail Energy Supply Association, at 9–10 (Aug. 29, 2024).
- ¹¹⁵ *Id.* at 15.
- ¹¹⁶ *Id.* at 14–15.
- ¹¹⁷ The trade group’s analyst observed that in January 2023 AEP projected only 248 megawatts of data center growth through 2038, but one year later AEP projected 3,700 megawatts of data center growth by 2030. *Id.* at 10 (citing PJM reports).
- ¹¹⁸ TYLER NORRIS ET AL., [RETHINKING LOAD GROWTH: ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL FOR INTEGRATION OF LARGE FLEXIBLE LOADS IN U.S. POWER SYSTEMS](#) 18 (Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & Sustainability, 2025).
- ¹¹⁹ *Id.* at 5–6.
- ¹²⁰ See Ari Peskoe, *Replacing the Utility Transmission Syndicate’s Control*, 44 ENERGY L. J. 547 (2023).
- ¹²¹ Exec. Order No. 14,141, 90 FR 5469 (2025).
- ¹²² *Id.*
- ¹²³ Va. J. Legis. Audit & Rev. Commission 2024-548, [Report to the Governor & the General Assembly of Virginia: Data Centers in Virginia](#), at viii (2024).
- ¹²⁴ Brody Ford & Matt Day, [Price Tag Jumps for Amazon’s Mississippi Data Centers Jump 60% to \\$16 Billion](#), BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31, 2025).
- ¹²⁵ *Id.*
- ¹²⁶ See generally NATHAN SHREVE, ZACHARY ZIMMERMAN & ROB GRAMLICH, [FEWER NEW MILES: THE US TRANSMISSION GRID IN THE 2020s](#), GRID STRATEGIES (Jul. 2024).
- ¹²⁷ U.S. Department of Energy, [National Transmission Needs Study](#) (Oct. 30, 2023).
- ¹²⁸ See Ari Peskoe, *Replacing the Utility Transmission Syndicate’s Control*, 44 ENERGY L. J. 547 (2023)

¹²⁹ Sonali Razdan, Jennifer Downing & Louise White, [*Pathways to Commercial Liftoff: Virtual Power Plants 2025 Update*](#), U.S. Department of Energy Loan Programs Office (Jan. 2025).

¹³⁰ See, e.g., Mississippi Power Company's Notice of IRP Cycle, Mississippi Public Service Comm'n Docket No. 2019-UA-231 (Jan. 9, 2025) (stating that because the utility has entered into two contracts with 600 MW of new load it will keep at least one coal plant open that had been slated for retirement); Mississippi Power Special Contract Filing, Mississippi Public Service Comm'n Docket No. 2025-UN-3 (Jan. 9, 2025) (showing that at least one of the two special contracts is with a data center).